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THE SEPARATION OF INTELLIGENCE AND CONTROL: 
RETIREMENT SAVINGS AND THE LIMITS OF SOFT 
PATERNALISM 
JACOB HALE RUSSELL* 
ABSTRACT 
“Soft paternalism” is in vogue among academics and lawmakers, but too 
much is being asked of it. This Article studies soft paternalist techniques—
including nudging and disclosure—which have been used in the employer-
sponsored retirement system. Defined-contribution retirement plans repre-
sent an ideal test case for libertarian paternalism: there has been extensive 
experimentation, and nudge advocates have often held up such plans as 
successes. In particular, this Article focuses on investment allocation deci-
sions in retirement portfolios, and suggests that we should be skeptical of 
the ability of soft paternalism to improve those decisions. When a domain 
is rife with conflicts of interest—as in the allocation context—soft-touch 
strategies fare poorly. Since our tax-incentivized retirement system has 
paternalistic roots, we should more readily consider direct regulation of 
investment options available to retirement accounts. 
The migration of American retirement savings from centralized, risk-
pooling structures (Social Security and pensions) toward individual re-
tirement plans (401(k) plans and other tax-favored, individually managed 
accounts) had collateral consequences. In particular, the responsibility for 
making complicated financial choices was redistributed to the individual 
saver—who typically lacks the knowledge and sophistication to make such 
choices. The result has been that many savers make costly mistakes in 
investing their portfolios. In response, academics and policymakers, most 
formally through the Pension Protection Act of 2006, have turned to a 
variety of typical “soft” remedies, including nudges designed to improve 
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investment decisions by allowing employers to automatically direct em-
ployee savings into certain default mutual funds. 
This Article argues that nudges have failed and will continue to fail in 
improving the allocation of retirement portfolios, because of problems that 
are common in many nudge programs. First, nudges rarely consider the 
ability of third parties to counter-nudge or to weaken nudge outcomes. 
Conflicts of interest are pervasive in the mutual fund and retirement in-
dustry, and those who accept the nudges are being pushed into a category 
of funds of dubious merit, and which appear to be worsening as institu-
tions seek to exploit the default. Second, nudges are often loosely connect-
ed, or not connected at all, to the cognitive problems they seek to remedy. 
In the retirement allocation context, the nudge acts as a weak mandate for 
a substantive preference, rather than as a corrective for investors’ cogni-
tive biases. Finally, nudging often asserts autonomy—taking an agent’s 
preferences seriously—as its central goal. But the claim that the retire-
ment allocation nudges respect savers’ preferences is problematic as a 
descriptive matter, and illogical as a normative matter, in a domain that is 
already a government-sponsored, tax-advantaged, paternalistic means to 
encourage retirement savings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Nudging is in vogue. As interest in behavioral economics has grown 
among legal scholars, and as nudges have demonstrated potential in cer-
tain domains to reduce the role cognitive errors play in our decision mak-
ing, academics have gone nudge-happy.1 The very phrase “libertarian 
paternalism” or “soft paternalism” suggests the satisfying promise of a 
third way in politics. 
However, critics are beginning to raise questions.2 This Article focuses 
on the U.S. retirement system as a domain for exploring when nudges and 
other “soft paternalist” solutions are likely to succeed.3 Many policymak-
ers and academics have been optimistic about a series of “soft paternalist” 
techniques—nudges and disclosure—that could improve the outcomes of 
defined-contribution plans, like 401(k) plans. Retirement provides an ideal 
test case for nudges: it is a domain full of well-documented cognitive 
biases, soft paternalists have claimed it as a domain of significant success 
for their project, and its legal architecture employs a series of nudges. In 
particular, the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA) included a number of 
“soft” reforms that attempted to influence decisions about whether to en-
roll, how much to contribute, and how to invest savings.4 
                                                                                                                         
1 The vast literature on nudging and soft paternalism is reviewed infra in Part I.B. For 
the best-known example for a popular audience, see generally CASS SUNSTEIN & 
RICHARD THALER, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAP-
PINESS (Yale Univ. Press, 2008). See also Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Liber-
tarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003) for an earlier, 
more academic version of their argument. While Thaler and Sunstein’s many articles on 
nudging have gotten the most popular and scholarly attention, other scholars have 
proposed similar broad strategies under phrases like “asymmetric paternalism”—nudges 
that help the boundedly rational while doing little harm to the “rational”—and “cautious 
paternalism.” See, e.g., Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted 
O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics 
and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003). 
2 See infra notes 45–52 and accompanying text for a discussion of soft paternalism’s 
critics. For an extended discussion of the role of behavioral economics in law more 
generally, and specifically noting that one of the main outcomes of the increased 
discussion has been policy proposals employing nudges, see MARK KELMAN, THE 
HEURISTICS DEBATE 152–78 and passim (Oxford Univ. Press 2011). In general, this 
Article is greatly influenced by that book and supports its skepticism that behavioral 
economics can solve regulatory problems in a neutral way, since we inevitably will wind 
up back at the question of whether subjects’ choices are substantively desirable. 
3 Academics have often treated nudges as a separate category from other soft, non-
regulatory approaches, but they pose related issues, and appear to satisfy the same under-
lying purpose (finding a “third way” that can satisfy pro- and anti-regulatory factions). 
4 Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, §§ 821–33, 901–906, 120 
Stat. 780, 782–83 (2006). 
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This Article argues that we should be more skeptical than nudge advo-
cates suggest—both in the retirement context and more generally. Opti-
mism about “soft” solutions is misplaced when it comes to decisions about 
how to invest retirement funds—that is, allocation problems—when nudg-
ing may provide little help and may even leave employees worse off. The 
defined-contribution system requires employees to make a series of dis-
tinct decisions: whether to enroll in a plan, how much to contribute to the 
plan, how to invest the funds in the plan, and (eventually) how to receive 
distributions of funds in retirement. Each decision poses a separate set of 
challenges, but too often they are conflated in discussions of nudges. The 
allocation step poses unique challenges because of the complexity of in-
vestment choices and because of the conflicts of interest involved. It is 
also potentially a very ripe domain for nudgers because of the well-
documented cognitive biases involved when individuals make investment 
decisions. A series of nudges added by the PPA allows employers to au-
tomatically allocate employees’ contributions into particular default 
funds—most commonly target-date funds (TDFs), mutual funds designed 
for employees who intend to retire in a given cohort (for example, the 
Vanguard Target Retirement 2040 Fund) whose investment strategy 
changes (in general by reducing risk) over the course of an employee’s 
career.5 An employee can redirect his contributions elsewhere, but the 
nudge is sticky for a large percentage of employees. 
This Article suggests that the libertarian paternalist project runs up 
against three problems in the allocation nudge context, which are also 
more broadly applicable to other nudge efforts. First, the allocation nudge 
is inattentive to the supply side, the retirement industry, which has re-
sponded to, and should be expected to respond to, the nudge in ways that 
undermine it. The investment decision is not made in a vacuum, and mis-
takes are made not just because of individual choices but also because of 
industry incentives to push more lucrative, higher-fee funds that diminish 
savers’ returns. Because the allocation decision involves misaligned incen-
tives and conflicts of interest6 between savers and the retirement industry, 
this nudge fares worse than nudges designed to increase contributions by 
automatically opting savers into plans—a nudge that benefits the supply 
and demand side equally. 
Second, although nudging developed as a response to insights in be-
havioral economics about biases that may consistently distort our decision 
making, the nudge seems entirely disconnected from its cognitive project. 
                                                                                                                         
5 See infra Part I for a more detailed description of both the PPA’s methodology and 
TDFs. 
6 Lauren Willis highlights the destructive role of conflicts of interest in nudging 
attempts for checking accounts and overdraft protection; see infra note 52. 
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In other words, the default-fund nudge does nothing to help savers under-
stand or overcome the types of cognitive mistakes that contribute to poor 
investment decisions—for instance, the gamblers’ fallacy or anchoring on 
inappropriate information. Instead, the nudge simply pushes a substantive 
outcome (somewhat weakly, because employees can opt out) that has no 
fundamental connection to the cognitive problem it seeks to solve, and 
may not even be the optimal substantive outcome if we were to simply 
mandate a single investment choice. Worse still, soft policies create feed-
back effects in which nudge-protected individuals feel safer and become 
more trusting, while regulated entities feel attacked and feel the need to 
respond more aggressively. 
Third, preserving autonomy is a central value for the libertarian pater-
nalist project, and this does not make much sense—either normatively or 
descriptively—in the retirement savings context. Retirement is a tax-
subsidized, paternalistic program designed to push people to save more 
than they otherwise would. In other words, it is a domain in which auton-
omy is already constrained. It is not clear that most people want poor in-
vestment choices to be respected on autonomy grounds; most individual 
savers are unlikely to have meaningful conceptions of their own prefer-
ences with respect to their retirement investment choices. Nor is it clear 
that we should let them, both because the system serves a societal func-
tion, and because it is not clear that “autonomy” requires us to prioritize 
the ends of a young saver who wants to invest riskily over the ends of his 
later self, who might prefer to have built a safe nest egg. 
The nudge program comes against the backdrop of a radically re-
formed retirement system that has separated intelligence about investment 
decisions from control over those investment decisions.7 Over the past 
four decades, the American retirement system has dramatically shifted risk 
onto the individual worker. A series of legal changes has diminished the 
role of centralized structures that pool risk across society, like employer-
sponsored pensions and Social Security, and increased the use of 401(k) 
and other individual retirement plans that increase personal choice but also 
                                                                                                                         
7 The title is, of course, a reference to the famous concept of the separation of 
ownership (shareholders) and control (management) developed in ADOLF A. BERLE & 
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (Macmillan 
rev. ed. 1932). Needless to say, my reference to retirement savers’ “intelligence” is meant 
only in a very narrow (and kind) sense—that is, to refer to the results of a variety of 
problems prevalent among savers, caused by everything from financial illiteracy to 
cognitive biases, or from market manipulation and conflicts of interest to savers simply 
choosing to focus on problems in life more interesting to them than the optimal design of 
a retirement portfolio. 
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personal risk.8 This shift closely parallels the more general political drift 
since the 1970s that has moved risk away from “broad structures of insur-
ance ... onto the fragile balance sheets of American families.”9 
In doing so, individual employees have become the central decision 
makers and monitors for a host of complicated investment questions—
including how much money to save, how to invest it, and how to draw down 
the money at retirement. Americans are asked to make the same kinds of 
decisions that an investment management committee composed of experi-
enced, well-compensated professionals at a large endowment fund or pen-
sion plan would make. Individual savers now make those decisions with 
the assistance of financial services players who have deeply misaligned in-
centives. The result has been a panoply of pathologies—decisions contrary 
to any imaginably rational approach to growing one’s retirement savings. 
These mistakes are well documented in the finance literature: many 
workers do not assign any investment options to their savings, leaving 
their retirement portfolio in cash or low-interest money market funds 
where it will decline relative to inflation; when leaving a job, many work-
ers cash out their retirement plans and pay a tax penalty, instead of rolling 
over the funds into a continuing retirement account; investors choose high-
fee funds despite overwhelming evidence that high-fee funds offer lower 
post-fee returns; employees fail to diversify and overinvest in employer 
stock; the average investor never rebalances their asset allocation, but 
overtrades individual stocks, which produces worse returns than simpler 
buying and holding strategies; savers use naïve portfolio allocation tech-
niques, namely by allocating an equal weight—the “1/N heuristic”—to 
each fund offered by their plan, regardless of which funds are offered; and 
employees fail to take advantage of employer matching programs for con-
tributions, which is tantamount to leaving cash on the floor.10 
                                                                                                                         
8 For a thorough analysis of this change in legal academia, see Edward A. Zelinsky, 
The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 470–71 (2004). For a political 
economy perspective on the related effects and the social underpinnings of this change, 
see JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE NEW ECONOMIC INSECURITY AND 
THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (Oxford Univ. Press 2008); for another account 
by Hacker, but focused more precisely on that risk shift in the retirement context, see 
Jacob S. Hacker, Restoring Retirement Security: The Market Crisis, the “Great Risk 
Shift,” and the Challenge for Our Nation, 19 ELDER L.J. 1, 1–48 (2011). 
The legal changes are discussed infra in Part I.A, but refer primarily to the tax code 
and to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). 
9 HACKER, supra note 8, at 6 (showing the risk shift in employment, health care, 
welfare, and other fields). 
10 See, e.g., James J. Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian & Andrew Metrick, 
For Better or Worse: Default Effects and 401(k) Savings Behavior, in PERSPECTIVES ON 
THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 119 (David A. Wise ed., 2004) (leaving in cash); Leonard E. 
Burman, Norma B. Coe & William G. Gale, What Happens When You Show Them the 
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Meanwhile, a retirement savings crisis looms. As the baby boom gen-
eration retires, the average working household has next to nothing—
$3,000—in retirement savings, and only 8 percent of working households 
meet even conservative goals for retirement savings.11 The source of the 
problem is complicated and larger than mistakes in defined-contribution 
retirement plans. But as those plans have grown in importance, those loss-
es have grown in significance.12 
Neither soft paternalists nor their libertarian critics have done much to 
explain why “autonomy” might be a relevant guiding principle for 401(k) 
allocation, or how their proposed strategies serve autonomy in any mean-
ingful way. We lack consensus about why we have the employer-spon-
sored, defined-contribution system in the first place. Employer-sponsored 
retirement plans emerged as a recruitment and retention tool for firms. But 
the move from defined-benefit to defined-contribution plans was tied up in 
the opposite logic: an advantage of defined-contribution plans is that they 
are more portable and make it easier for workers to switch firms.13 The 
origins of the switch are murky and at least partly accidental: the 401(k) 
                                                                                                                         
Money?: Lump Sum Distributions, Retirement Income Security, and Public Policy, THE 
URBAN INST. (Nov. 1999), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/LSD 
_Final.pdf (not rolling over); Mark M. Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund 
Performance, 52 J. FIN. 57, 57–82 (1997) (insufficient attention to fees); James J. Choi, 
David Laibson & Brigitte C. Madrian, Are Empowerment and Education Enough? 
Underdiversification in 401(k) Plans, in 2:2005 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY 200, available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Projects/BPEA/Fall 
%202005/2005b_bpea_choi.pdf (overinvestment in employer stock); William Samuelson 
& Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 
7, 26 (1988) (lack of rebalancing); Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Trading Is 
Hazardous to Your Wealth: The Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual 
Investors, 55 J. FIN. 773, 774 (2000) (overtrade individual stocks); Shlomo Benartzi & 
Richard H. Thaler, Naive Diversification Strategies in Defined Contribution Saving 
Plans, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 79, 80 (2001) (1/N heuristic); Olivia S. Mitchell et al., Turn-
ing Workers into Savers? Incentives, Liquidity, and Choice in 401(k) Plan Design 1–2 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11725, 2005), available at http: 
//www.nber.org/papers/w11725 (employer match); infra note 36 (literature identifying others). 
11 Nari Rhee, The Retirement Savings Crisis: Is It Worse Than We Think?, NAT’L 
INST. ON RET. SEC. 11, 15 (June 2013), available at http://www.nirsonline.org/storage 
/nirs/documents/Retirement%20Savings%20Crisis/retirementsavingscrisis_final.pdf 
(reporting that the average retirement account balance is only $12,000 for near-retirement 
households.). 
12 One study found that the average household would spend roughly $155,000 in 
401(k) fees during the course of a lifetime, eating up a third of their potential returns. 
Robert Hiltonsmith, The Retirement Savings Drain: The Hidden & Excessive Costs of 
401(k)s, DEMOS (May 29, 2012), http://www.demos.org/publication/retirement-savings 
-drain-hidden-excessive-costs-401ks; see infra notes 38, 125, 129. 
13 Beyond literal portability (for which there are technical solutions), many defined-
benefit plans’ calculations are related to firm tenure and seniority, providing a powerful 
incentive to stay with the same firm. 
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section was hardly debated when it was added to the Internal Revenue 
Code in 1978, and its widespread use was not anticipated.14 
A number of motives are plausible, and each would dictate a distinct 
set of values to guide policy. Most importantly, it is not at all obvious that 
“autonomy” should be the central value guiding the system. Whatever its 
original purpose, employer-sponsored retirement benefits have grown in 
size to the point that we may imagine them serving primarily a societal 
function, adding to the safety net that helps prevent retirees from becom-
ing financial wards of the state. In other words, a paternalist theory al-
ready underpins employer-sponsored plans: we provide tax incentives 
because we worry that Americans will save too little in a regime with no 
intervention.15 This theory does not answer every question facing a poli-
cymaker—for instance, whether we should worry more about maximizing 
total aggregate savings or about the distribution of those savings.16 But the 
current system seems weakly suited to serving either function. It is possi-
ble that the most compelling feature is serving as a lucrative subsidy to the 
retirement and financial services industry. 
This Article first introduces the broad contours of the contemporary 
U.S. retirement system in Part I, with particular attention to the soft pater-
nalism strategies added in 2006 by the PPA. That law employs nudges (a 
concept explored in Part I.B.1) both to increase employee enrollment and 
contribution rates (Part I.B.2) and to improve employees’ investment deci-
sions and portfolio allocation (Part I.C). In Part II, this Article delves into 
the problems on the supply side, and the ways in which the mutual fund 
and retirement savings industry has responded to, and should be expected 
to respond to, nudges in ways that undermine their purpose. Part III focus-
es on the demand side of the equation, noting the gap between the problem 
addressed by the PPA’s nudges—cognitive biases—and its solutions. Part 
III.B criticizes the normative backdrop that underlies the nudging pro-
gram, and questions whether autonomy is a meaningful value in the re-
tirement savings context. Part III.C expresses skepticism of two other 
remedies that are short of direct product regulation—increased disclosure 
regimes, and a limited set of fiduciary duties supplied by ERISA.  
                                                                                                                         
14 Richard Rubin & Margaret Collins, You Can Thank or Blame Richard Stanger for 
Writing 401(k), BLOOMBERG (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print 
/2014-02-03/you-can-thank-or-blame-richard-stanger-for-writing-401-k-.html. 
15 See Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and 
Economic Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1280–83 (1991) (“Congress clearly supposes 
that people are unable to make wise savings decisions for themselves.”). It is not clear 
that the system of tax breaks works very well at increasing savings; see infra note 24. 
16 See infra note 68 and accompanying text. In critiquing the role of nudging in 
contribution decisions, some scholars, I think quite problematically, assume that we 
should measure total aggregate savings, and thus discount possible relative gains from 
contribution nudging to the least-well-off employee. 
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I. THE SOFT PATERNALIST EXPERIMENT IN RETIREMENT SAVINGS 
A. The U.S. Retirement System 
Along with Social Security and private savings, employer-sponsored 
retirement accounts form the so-called “three-legged stool” of the American 
retirement savings system.17 Employer-sponsored retirement plans come in 
two primary flavors: defined-benefit plans (sometimes called “pensions,” al-
though the term is also sometimes used to refer to all employer-sponsored 
retirement plans) and defined-contribution plans (of which 401(k) plans 
are the best-known example). As these names suggest, a defined-benefit 
plan pays out pre-specified, guaranteed benefits to an employee upon 
retirement, often defined as a percentage of an employee’s pre-retirement 
salary. In a defined-contribution plan, employees contribute a fixed amount 
of their salary, sometimes alongside an employer contribution,18 to an ac-
count that the employee intends to access after retirement. The employee 
typically has a variety of choices about how to invest those funds, and thus 
the exact level of benefits that will be available after retirement are typi-
cally uncertain ex ante to the employee. 
The private retirement system19 is incentivized and regulated by a 
combination of tax laws and other statutes, most notably the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (ERISA).20 ERISA 
regulates private retirement plans by imposing fiduciary duties, disclosure 
requirements, and substantive regulation (such as vesting rules and mini-
mum funding requirements) on plan sponsors and a variety of administrators 
who support the plans. The tax code provides for a variety of advantages 
for money saved for retirement. The best known are “401(k)” plans,21 
employer-sponsored defined-contribution plans that allow employees to 
                                                                                                                         
17 This metaphor, often mistakenly attributed to Franklin D. Roosevelt, has been in 
use since at least 1949, although its origins are murky. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., RESEARCH 
NOTE #1: ORIGINS OF THE THREE-LEGGED STOOL METAPHOR FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 
(May 1996), available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/stool.html. 
18 From an economic standpoint, the divide between employee and employer 
contribution is seen as largely irrelevant, because an employer contribution is simply part 
of the total compensation an employer allocates to an individual employee (the 
psychological effects of the labeling choice are less clear). 
19 This Article focuses on employer-sponsored pension plans and largely sets aside 
issues related to public pensions, such as those run by state employers, which raise a 
variety of important but distinct and substantially unrelated policy issues. 
20 The most relevant provisions of ERISA are codified at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001–1461 
(West 2014). 
21 Similar defined-contribution plans include 403(b) plans offered by non-profit 
institutions and 401(a) plans offered by certain state-affiliated employers. For the 
purposes of this Article, the distinctions matter little. 
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contribute money on a pre-tax basis that will be taxed at withdrawal, nor-
mally after retirement. 
The 401(k) subsidy costs $79.7 billion in tax spending—foregone tax 
revenues—for fiscal year 2014, third only to the employer-provided health 
insurance and home mortgage deductions.22 Tax breaks to defined-benefit 
plans cost another $53.1 billion, and are ranked sixth on the list of tax 
expenditures.23 Although these tax expenditures are widely assumed to 
encourage Americans to save more than they otherwise would, they may 
not be as productive as was hoped: one recent influential study suggested 
that the savings effect of a retirement tax break might be on the order of an 
extra penny saved for every dollar of tax code spending.24 
Over the past half century, a well-documented shift has taken place in 
the U.S. retirement savings system away from defined-benefit plans and 
toward defined-contribution plans.25 In 1989, 42 percent of full-time 
workers in the private sector participated in defined-benefit plans; as of 
2012, that number had fallen to 20 percent.26 Over the same time period, 
the share of participants in defined-contribution plans increased from 40 
percent to 51 percent.27 Law has aided and abetted this shift in two ways. 
First, law defines the options available for retirement savings through tax 
code incentives, government programs, and direct regulation, and the legal 
regime can change the attractiveness of various options. Second, the legal 
regime, most notably in the form of ERISA, defines and allocates fiduci-
ary duties and other forms of legal responsibility between parties. 
                                                                                                                         
22 Memorandum from the Members of the Fed. Accounting Standards Advisory Bd. 
to Wendy M. Payne, Executive Director of the Fed. Accounting Standards Advisory Bd. 
4 (Oct. 18, 2013), available at http://www.fasab.gov/pdffiles/2013oct_tab_a_taxex.pdf. 
23 Id. 
24 Raj Chetty et al., Active vs. Passive Decisions and Crowd-Out in Retirement 
Savings Accounts: Evidence from Denmark 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 18565, 2012), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18565. Although the 
study was based in Denmark, where better data was available, it has been widely cited in 
U.S. economics and policymaking circles. See, e.g., Annie Lowrey, Study Questions Tax 
Breaks’ Effect on Retirement Savings, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG (Nov. 25, 2012, 
10:43 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/study-questions-tax-breaks 
-effect-on-retirement-savings/. 
For an argument that draws in part on the study to argue that nudging may outperform 
fines and taxation in social benefits, see Brian Galle, Tax, Command ... or Nudge, 92 
TEX. L. REV. 837 (2014). 
25 See supra note 1. 
26 Barbara A. Butrica & Nadia S. Karamcheva, Automatic Enrollment, Employee 
Compensation, and Retirement Security 2 (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Bos. Coll., Working 
Paper No. CRR WP 2012-25, 2012), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads 
/2012/11/wp_2012-25-508.pdf. 
27 Id. 
46 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:035 
The economic effects of the switch to defined-contribution plans are 
unclear. Given the relationship between risk and return, for some individ-
uals, of course, defined-contribution plans will provide superior perfor-
mance and result in more savings at retirement. That same principle also 
alters the distribution of outcomes—that is, a number of investors will 
produce poor returns, whether from outright mistakes or from “bad luck” 
despite “good decisions”—and creates considerable uncertainty about how 
much money an individual saver will have at retirement. Weighing those 
two requires a normative theory of the purpose of our retirement savings 
system, a point I return to in Part II.C. 
The tradeoff between defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans is 
often seen as categorically favoring defined-contribution plans for overall 
returns, but some analysts have found otherwise. In a number of studies, 
and for non-trivial time periods, defined-benefit plans offered overall 
superior returns to 401(k) plans despite their lower risk profile to the indi-
vidual employee.28 As always, what you find depends on what you look at: 
for instance, tracking overall or average account balances, as a leading 
mutual fund industry trade group likes to do, is flawed because it does not 
show to what extent gains or losses are attributable to contributions and 
withdrawals versus investment performance.29 
Under ERISA, an employer has the fiduciary duties of prudence and of 
loyalty to plan participants in administering the plan.30 Beyond the employer, 
other agents are covered by fiduciary duties if they exercise any discretionary 
authority or discretionary control in the management or administration of the 
plan or its assets.31 But ERISA makes significant exceptions to fiduciaries’ 
responsibility with respect to investors’ self-directed assets: under Section 
404(c), when an individual participant “exercises control over the assets in 
his account ... no person who is otherwise a fiduciary shall be liable under 
this part for any loss, or by reason of any breach, which results from such 
                                                                                                                         
28 See, e.g., Linda Stern, Why Pension Funds Are Eating Your 401(k)’s Lunch, 
REUTERS (May 22, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USL2N0E31I22013 
0522 (describing an ongoing study in which defined-benefit plans have outperformed 
defined-contribution plans repeatedly over the past several decades, especially during 
bear markets). But see Jack VanDerhei, Reality Checks: A Comparative Analysis of 
Future Benefits from Private-Sector, Voluntary-Enrollment 401(k) Plans vs. Stylized, 
Final-Average-Pay Defined Benefit and Cash Balance Plans, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH 
INST., Issue Brief No. 387, June 2013 at 1, available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf 
/EBRI_IB_06-13.No387.K-DBs.pdf (noting that for stylized portfolios, 401(k)s out-
performed defined-benefit plans over a twenty-seven-year period). 
29 Floyd Norris, Misleading Numbers on 401(k)’s, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG 
(Oct. 17, 2013, 4:34 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/17/misleading 
-numbers-on-401ks/. 
30 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2012). 
31 § 1002(3)(21)(A); see also JOHN H. LANGBEIN, DAVID A. PRATT & SUSAN J. STABILE, 
PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 543–47 (5th ed., Foundation Press 2010). 
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participant’s or beneficiary’s exercise of control.”32 In other words, inves-
tors are responsible for their own mistakes. The duties of prudence and 
care still govern the fiduciaries’ decisions about what investment choices 
to offer, but plaintiffs have rarely won (except in a string of recent settle-
ments, discussed in Part III.C) under theories of poor menu design. In 
addition, ERISA exempts holdings in the employer’s own stock from the 
statute’s diversification requirements.33 
What is clear is that many individuals make poor decisions in invest-
ing their defined-contribution assets, mistakes cited in the Introduction, 
which have been exhaustively covered elsewhere.34 This is hardly surpris-
ing given the voluminous evidence both on low financial literacy35 and on 
behavioral and cognitive biases.36 Employees face a dizzying array of 
choices, with the average 401(k) plan containing twenty investment op-
tions,37 which employees may not even be interested in thinking about. It 
is also not surprising given the bad menus offered to many employees. In 
one recent study by Ian Ayres and Quinn Curtis, 10.2 percent of the opti-
mal risk premium was consumed by plan expenses, fund fees, and menu 
design limitations; another 13.1 percent was eaten up by bad investor 
choices within those menus.38 In another study, participant investment choices 
were shown to involve mistakes that could reduce retirement wealth by 20 
percent over a twenty-year career.39 In short, these mistakes are expensive 
and an inevitable result of the current defined-contribution system. 
                                                                                                                         
32 § 1104(c). 
33 Id. § 1104(a)(2). 
34 These are briefly cataloged in the Introduction, supra note 11. For a short literature 
review citing most of the relevant pieces, see NING TANG, OLIVIA S. MITCHELL, GARY 
MOTTOLA & STEVE UTKUS, UNIV. OF MICH. RET. RESEARCH CTR., THE EFFICIENCY OF PENSION 
MENUS AND INDIVIDUAL PORTFOLIO CHOICE IN 401(K) PENSIONS 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.mrrc.isr.umich.edu/publications/briefs/pdf/rb203.pdf. For a narrative overview, 
see Melissa A. Z. Knoll, The Role of Behavioral Economics and Behavioral Decision 
Making in Americans’ Retirement Savings Decisions, 70 SOC. SEC. BULLETIN 1, 1 (2010), 
available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v70n4/v70n4p1.html. 
35 See infra note 101. For an informed critique of why we should not rely on financial 
literacy education as a remedy, see Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial Literacy 
Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 198 (2008); Lauren E. Willis, The Financial Education 
Fallacy, 101 AMER. ECON. REV. 429, 429–34 (2011). 
36 See infra Part II.B. For a literature review, see LIBRARY OF CONG. FED. RESEARCH 
DIV., BEHAVIORAL PATTERNS AND PITFALLS OF U.S. INVESTORS (Aug. 2010), available 
at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/SEC_Investor-Behavior.pdf; see also TANG ET AL., 
supra note 34, and Knoll, supra note 34. 
37 DELOITTE, ANNUAL 401(K) SURVEY RETIREMENT READINESS 15 (2010), available 
at https://www.iscebs.org/Resources/Surveys/Documents/401%28k%29Survey_10.pdf. 
38 Quinn Curtis & Ian Ayres, Measuring Fiduciary and Investor Losses in 401(k) 
Plans, 7TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 3 (2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2107796. 
39 TANG ET AL., supra note 34, at 15. 
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B. Enrollment and Nudging 
1. The Rise and Allure of Nudging 
Over the past few decades, the legal academy has become increasingly 
intrigued by behavioral research, largely originating within psychology 
and economics departments, on cognitive biases that distort individuals’ 
choices. This research is causing us to deviate significantly from the be-
havior predicted by traditional rational-choice models of behavior.40 In 
response to this recognition, nudging has come into vogue. The term, 
sometimes called “soft paternalism” or “libertarian paternalism,” refers to 
policy strategies that recognize the degree to which framing, defaults, and 
“choice architecture” affect decision making because of cognitive biases 
like anchoring, availability, or the herd mentality.41 By recognizing and 
refining those elements, policymakers can have their cake and eat it too: 
they can present choices to individuals in a way that “nudges” more of 
them into making a “better”42 decision, while still in theory respecting 
individual autonomy to make a different choice. The legal academy has 
followed the sets of nudges suggested by the best-known authors on nudg-
ing, Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler—which range from requiring driv-
ers to affirmatively make a decision whether to become organ donors 
during license renewal, a so-called “active choosing” strategy,43 to requir-
ing extra drivers’ education to obtain a license to drive a motorcycle with-
out a helmet44—with numerous other suggestions. 
Nudging is not without its critics. The predominant “anti-nudge” 
school comes from the libertarian right. It is focused on critiquing the concept 
of libertarian paternalism as an intellectually inconsistent “oxymoron”—
essentially thinly veiled paternalism that is inconsistent with libertarian 
principles.45 Nudgers have countered that the critique does not make sense 
                                                                                                                         
40 The most accessible treatment by a leading developer of this field is DANIEL 
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (Farrar, Straus & Giroux eds., 2011). A key 
early article that introduced these issues to the legal academy was Christine Jolls, Cass 
Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1471 (1998). For a book-length analysis of some of the limitations of this work that 
assesses its effects on the legal academy, as well as debates within cognitive psychology 
over which of several theories better explains the experimental results, see KELMAN, 
supra note 2. 
41 See SUNSTEIN & THALER, supra note 1, at 252–53. 
42 On whether nudges should be used to improve overall social welfare or to help each 
individual optimize his or her own personal choice, see Russell Korobkin, Libertarian 
Welfarism, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1651, 1651–86 (2009). 
43 See SUNSTEIN & THALER, supra note 1, at 175–82. 
44 Id. at 232 (crediting N.Y. Times columnist John Tierney for the suggestion). 
45 See, most notably, Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism is an Oxymoron, 99 
NW. U. L. REV. 1245, 1246–48 (2005) (critiquing libertarian paternalism for failing to 
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given what we know about how these cognitive biases distort decisions.46 
In essence, it is hard to understand how libertarianism as a philosophical 
commitment would require letting people err unintentionally and unreflec-
tively as to the means to their chosen end—to err even when the mistake 
committed is beyond the actor’s control and the actor, if given the infor-
mation necessary to correct the error, would prefer to correct the error. 
Other scholars have described specific limitations of nudges, either in 
particular applications or by identifying general scope conditions where 
nudges work best. Charles Sabel and William Simon define two approach-
es to administrative law, “minimalism”—which emphasizes market-based 
techniques, including nudging—and “experimentalism”—under which cen-
tral institutions delegate authority to, and actively monitor, local regula-
tors. They argue that although minimalism has dominated recent legal 
scholarship, experimentalism may be more effective, in part because it is 
more responsive and adaptive.47 Using a formal model, other scholars 
argued that sticky defaults were most welfare-improving in situations 
where individuals were sufficiently homogenous. By contrast, in situations 
where needs are heterogeneous or individual information is otherwise 
generally valuable, default options may be damaging because they decrease 
incentives for individuals to acquire information about their choices.48 
In an empirical study, Dan Ho showed that whatever their theoretical 
benefits, nudges may suffer from flaws in implementation. In one common 
nudge—the use of prominent restaurant grades to encourage compliance 
with health codes—“jurisdictions fudge more than nudge,” with signifi-
cant grade inflation and inconsistency between grading periods. In addi-
tion, public health inspectors spent valuable time on disputes over grades, 
rather than on more substantive efforts to improve restaurant safety.49 
Most recently, Ryan Bubb and Richard Pildes argued that nudgers in 
the legal academy too often conflate their social science agenda with their 
                                                                                                                         
justify its preference for welfare over liberty, for potentially redistributing from “rational” 
to “irrational” actors, and for being indistinguishable from typical attempts by central 
planners to intrude on personal autonomy). See also Douglas G. Whitman & Mario J. 
Rizzo, Paternalist Slopes, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 411, 413 (2007) (arguing that soft 
paternalism may lead us down the slippery slope to disastrous hard paternalism, so we should 
be wary of claims by “soft” paternalists that their intervention methods are modest). 
46 See, e.g., Sunstein & Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism, supra note 1. 
47 Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the 
Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 93 (2011). 
48 See Bruce Ian Carlin et al., Libertarian Paternalism, Information Sharing, and 
Financial Decision-Making 2–3 (Mar. 7, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1570158. 
49 Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure and Restaurant 
Grading, 122 YALE L.J. 574 (2012). 
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political agenda.50 In particular, they argue, nudgers tend to ignore the fact 
that behavioral economics may actually point to harder paternalism than 
nudging allows. In addition, behavioral economics suggests that certain 
nudges will be limited in effect, and that nudges can be so sticky that 
wrongly calibrated nudges will badly misfire.51 Lauren Willis has noted 
that when firms oppose nudges, they may find other ways to counteract 
them. She points to evidence that banks have been successful in getting 
people to opt into so-called “overdraft protection,”52 undermining a 
change in law designed to protect people from the abusive practice by 
requiring affirmative opt-ins before banks could extend them the automat-
ic high-interest, low-risk loans to cover transactions on overdrawn debit 
cards.53 In the most direct assault on nudging and its philosophical under-
pinnings, philosopher Sarah Conly has used the same kind of findings 
from behavioral economics upon which the nudgers rely to argue that we 
should not be so afraid of a harder paternalism.54 
2. Nudging to Increase Contribution to Retirement Plans 
In 2006, partly in order to address reforms in the funding of defined-
benefit pension plans, Congress enacted the PPA.55 The law took advantage 
of insights from behavioral economics; most notably, it encouraged the 
use of nudges to increase enrollment in and contributions to 401(k) plans. 
Automatic enrollment, which the PPA made easier,56 is lauded among the 
chief successes of “nudging” in the real world, and its supposed success is 
                                                                                                                         
50 See Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails 
and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1594 (2014). 
51 See id. 
52 See Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1155, 1174–207 (2013). I return to Willis’s excellent article in Part II, a section that makes a 
similar, though distinct, argument in the retirement allocation context. 
53 Id. at 1174. 
54 See generally SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY: JUSTIFYING COERCIVE PATER-
NALISM (2013) (arguing that autonomy is overrated, because of our false belief that we 
are more rational than we actually are). 
55 See supra note 4. 
56 For a thorough summary of the changes the PPA made to the auto-enrollment 
scheme (and changes made by the PPA more generally), see GROOM LAW GROUP, 
SUMMARY COMPARISON OF CURRENT LAW AND THE PRINCIPAL PROVISIONS OF THE PENSION 
PROTECTION ACT OF 2006: CHANGES PRIMARILY AFFECTING DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS, 
IRAS, GOVERNMENTAL AND TAX-EXEMPT EMPLOYER PLANS, AND INSURANCE PROGRAMS 
7–11 (2006), available at http://www.groom.com/assets/htmldocuments/PPADCAIRA 
ReformsFINAL.pdf. Auto-enrollment had previously been possible under Department of 
Labor and IRS rulemaking. The PPA created safe harbors that would protect companies 
from possible violations of ERISA’s nondiscrimination provisions—which are designed 
to level the playing field in retirement savings between highly compensated and less 
compensated employees—that could arise as the result of auto-enrollment. 
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regularly cited as an argument for trying nudge-based tactics in other poli-
cy domains. 
A major problem with defined-contribution plans has been encourag-
ing employees to enroll and to contribute a portion of their paycheck. 
Fewer workers participate in defined-contribution plans when offered than 
in defined-benefit plans.57 The PPA’s strategy was inspired by academic 
studies58 that showed huge increases in enrollment when companies 
switched to auto-enrolling employees, who could then choose to opt out, 
in 401(k) plans. Although purely rational employees would be expected to 
set their 401(k) contributions to their desired rate of savings (or a zero 
percent rate) regardless of the default enrollment, dramatic increases in 
enrollment and savings rates occurred when employers switched to “opt-
out” auto-enrollment from “opt-in” systems.59 In one influential study, 
participation went up 48 percent among newly hired employees, and 11 
percent overall, in just fifteen months when one large U.S. company began 
using auto-enrollment.60 In other words, simple tweaks to plan design 
could be very effective in overcoming inertia and other impediments to 
saving. Perhaps best of all, effects appeared particularly strong for popula-
tions that previously participated in the company’s 401(k) plans at low 
rates, including young, lower-paid, Hispanic and Black employees.61 
Since the PPA was adopted, the number of employers using auto-
enrollment has soared by some estimates from 4 percent in 1999 to 24 
percent in 2006 to 46 percent in 2011.62 At one employer, TIAA-CREF, 
participation jumped from 63 percent to 95 percent, with an average defer-
ral rate of 7 percent, following the use of auto-enrollment.63 The results for 
employees’ long-term savings accumulation could be significant.64 
                                                                                                                         
57 In 2012, 89 percent of those employees in the private sector who were offered 
defined-benefit plans participated, compared to only seventy percent in defined-
contribution plans. See Butrica & Karamcheva, supra note 26, at 2. 
58 See id. at 3. 
59 See, e.g., Choi et al., supra note 10, at 12. 
60 Brigitte Madrian & Dennis Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) 
Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1149, 1149–88 (2001). 
61 Id. at 1160–61. 
62 Butrica & Karamcheva, supra note 26, at 5. 
63 See Press Release, TIAA-CREF Financial Services, TIAA-CREF Study Finds 
Automatic Enrollment in 401(k) Plans Boosts Employee Participation (Nov. 21, 2011), 
available at http://www1.tiaa-cref.org/public/about/press/about_us/releases/pressrelease 
405.html. 
64 Jack VanDerhei, The Impact of Automatic Enrollment in 401(k) Plans on Future 
Retirement Accumulations: A Simulation Study Based on Plan Design Modifications of 
Large Plan Sponsors, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., Issue Brief No. 341, April 2010, at 
5, available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_04-2010_No341_Auto-Enroll1 
.pdf. 
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While the benefits seem largely positive, there are some mixed effects as 
well. There is evidence that employer contributions are reduced when employ-
ers switch to auto-enrollment, which could mean that some employees who 
would have participated anyway save less.65 A similar problem stems from 
the fact that the effects of inertia are strong, and employees typically stick 
with the savings rate set by their employer default. For most auto-enroll-
ment employers, that rate is 2 percent or 3 percent, which may be too low 
and undercut accumulation, but trying to increase those default savings rates 
may increase opt-outs.66 Clearly, that effect is worst for those who would have 
had the highest savings rates before the adoption of auto-enrollment, and 
thus it may primarily affect higher-income employers. There is also evidence 
of a plateau effect in the number of employers adopting auto-enrollment.67 
Bubb and Pildes use this negative evidence as a key example of their 
diagnosis of the problem in behavioral law and economics more generally. 
In particular, they note the troubling possibility that overall savings may have 
fallen as a result of auto-enrollment.68 This particular critique seems over-
stated. As they acknowledge in a footnote, auto-enrollment may have im-
proved the distribution of savings—that is, helping the most vulnerable 
savers at the expense of well-off savers.69 It is quite plausible that increas-
ing aggregate savings is a less important goal than improving savings 
outcomes at the lower end of the spectrum. Bubb and Pildes also express 
concern that we do not know much about the types of people who opt out, 
beyond some suggestive evidence.70 As Sunstein and Peter Orszag have 
countered, such critiques mainly indicate that we should nudge smarter.71 
                                                                                                                         
65 See Barbara A. Butrica & Nadia S. Karamcheva, How Does 401(k) Auto-Enroll-
ment Relate to the Employer Match and Total Compensation? (Ctr. for Retirement Re-
search at Bos. Coll. Issue Brief No. 13-14, 2013); see also Barbara A. Butrica & 
Mauricio Soto, Will Automatic Enrollment Reduce Employer Contributions to 401(k) 
Plans? (Urban Inst., Retirement Policy Program Discussion Paper No. 09-04, 2009), 
available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/411995_employer_contributions_paper.pdf. 
66 See Choi et al., supra note 10, at 4. 
67 See Anne Tergesen, 401(k) Auto-Enrollment Tapers Off, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 15, 2013, 
2:30 PM), http://blogs.marketwatch.com/encore/2013/03/15/401k-auto-enrollment-tapers 
off/tab/print/ (quoting a Vanguard researcher who believes that auto-enrollment is most 
appealing to large companies, which limits the room for future growth). 
68 Bubb & Pildes, supra note 50, at 1622 n.89. Problematically, it is not at all clear 
that a falling total average contribution rate between the pre-recession year of 2007 and 
the post-recession year of 2011 has mainly to do with the effects of auto-enrollment 
rather than broader macroeconomic trends. 
69 Id. at 1623. 
70 See id. at 1626 (noting the troubling evidence that opt-out decisions are correlated 
with lack of trust in financial institutions, which may not be a rational reason to opt out). 
71 Peter Orszag & Cass Sunstein, Give People Choices, Not Edicts, BLOOMBERG 
NEWS (Dec. 5, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-12-05 
/give-people-choices-not-edicts. 
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Two other nudge-based strategies to improving enrollment have been 
tested and advocated. Under “Save More Tomorrow,” proposed by Thaler 
and Shlomo Benartzi, an individual’s contribution rate would escalate each 
year.72 Under “active decision,” participants are not automatically enrolled 
in a retirement plan, but are required to make an affirmative choice—to 
contribute or not to contribute—rather than having a sticky default.73 One 
study found that active decision led to a 28 percent enrollment increase 
when compared to no auto-enrollment.74 The authors argued that active 
decisions were preferable for decisions that involved tendencies to procrasti-
nate and fairly heterogeneous preferences that ought to be respected, but 
that in fields characterized by widespread financial illiteracy, default en-
rollment was preferable.75 
C. Allocation and Nudging 
The PPA’s authors hoped nudging could help solve not just the en-
rollment problem but also the portfolio allocation and investment prob-
lems documented in Part I.A. The PPA and a series of Department of 
Labor rules try to use soft strategies, such as nudges, increased disclo-
sure,76 and fiduciary duties,77 to prevent some of the most egregious mis-
takes savers make in their investment decisions. Notably, the rules allow 
employers to make default investments for their participants, which, like 
auto-enrollment, can be overridden, but are likely to be sticky for many 
participants.78 These default investments are nudges in two senses: first, by 
modifying fiduciary duty rules to provide safe harbors—providing certain-
ty that is highly sought after in ERISA’s complex regulatory environ-
ment—they nudge employers toward using these optional default invest-
ment arrangements; second, the employers who use them nudge their 
participants into particular investments, but the employers always retain 
the right to opt out. 
In 2007, using its authority under the PPA, the DoL issued rules mak-
ing it easier for employers to invest their employees’ undirected assets in 
                                                                                                                         
72 Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow™: Using Behavioral 
Economics to Increase Employee Savings, 112 J. POL. ECON. S164, S170–71 (Supp. 
2004) (the proposed plan would again allow participants to opt-out). 
73 See Gabriel D. Carroll, James J. Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian & 
Andrew Metrick, Optimal Defaults And Active Decisions, 134 Q.J. ECON. 1403, 1639–40 
(Nov. 2009). 
74 Id. at 1639. 
75 See id. at 1639–74. 
76 See infra Part III.C.1. 
77 See infra Part III.C.2. 
78 26 U.S.C.A. § 414(w)(3) (West 2014). 
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Qualified Default Investment Alternatives (QDIAs).79 The default invest-
ment rules solved a key concern of plan fiduciaries: whether they would be 
held responsible for investment losses if they allocated a participant’s 
funds to a particular investment. Under the DoL’s rules, they would not be 
liable, so long as the investments met the QDIA test and certain other 
rules.80 Fiduciaries would still have a duty of prudence in choosing the QDIAs. 
QDIAs are defined extensively in the rule, but include many lifecycle or 
target-date funds, certain balanced funds, and certain managed accounts.81 
Since the PPA, TDFs, a relatively recent invention, have exploded in 
popularity and emerged overwhelmingly as the primary QDIA.82 (Con-
cerns about TDFs are the topic of Part II.C below.) TDFs are designed for 
employees retiring around a specific year—for instance, the Vanguard 
Target Retirement 2050 Fund is for employees who expect to retire around 
2050—and change their investment strategy to become increasingly con-
servative as an employee approaches retirement (at the most rudimentary 
level, a high exposure to equities early on, shifting over time to a high exposure 
to bonds). Most of these products are “funds of funds,” which simply hold 
other funds run by the same mutual fund family and charge an additional 
fee. For instance, JPMorgan SmartRetirement 2050 Institutional Class held, 
                                                                                                                         
79 Default Investment Alternatives Under Participant Directed Individual Account 
Plans, 72 Fed. Reg. 60,452 (Oct. 24, 2007) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550). 
80 See id. For an excellent description of the rule’s operation, see GROOM LAW GROUP, 
DOL ISSUES FINAL DEFAULT REGULATIONS: MANY QUESTIONS ANSWERED, MANY QUESTIONS 
REMAIN 2–4 (2007), available at http://www.groom.com/media/publication/4_final 
defaultregarticle.pdf. 
81 See Default Investment Alternatives, 72 Fed. Reg. 60,479–80 (including, for 
instance, “an investment fund ... that applies generally accepted investment theories, is 
diversified so as to minimize the risk of large losses and that is designed to provide 
varying degrees of long-term appreciation and capital preservation through a mix of 
equity and fixed income exposures based on the participant’s age, target retirement 
date...or life expectancy. Such products and portfolios change their asset allocations and 
associated risk levels over time with the objective of becoming more conservative (i.e., 
decreasing risk of losses) with increasing age.... An example of such a fund or portfolio 
may be a ‘life-cycle’ or ‘targeted-retirement-date’ fund.”). 
Under very limited circumstances, largely having to do with certain situations where 
funds were already using such products before the rules, QDIAs may also include 
principal-preservation products, including stable value funds and money market funds—
products that earn low, but almost always positive, returns. Id. at 60,480. 
82 See, e.g., Jean A. Young, Target-Date Fund Adoption in 2012, RESEARCH NOTE 
(Vanguard), Feb. 2013, at 1, available at https://pressroom.vanguard.com/content 
/nonindexed/2.11.2013_Target_Date_Fund_Adoption_in_2012.pdf (reporting that 27 
percent of Vanguard retirement participants were invested exclusively in a single TDF in 
2012, three times higher than in 2007; Vanguard estimates that by 2017, 55 percent of all 
plan participants and 80 percent of new plan participants will be in TDFs). 
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as of December 21, 2013, roughly two-dozen other JPMorgan funds.83 The 
fund charged seventy-five basis points in annual expenses, of which sev-
enty-one basis points came from “acquired fund fees,” which were the fees 
charged by the underlying funds, and thus passed through to owners of the 
2050 lifecycle fund.84 
In addition, the DoL’s rules allowed an even stronger nudge—a 
shove—to move current employees’ existing allocations into QDIAs.85 
Called reenrollment or reset, the approach allows an employer to move all an 
employee’s funds out of his or her current investments and into the fund’s 
default investment vehicle.86 Employers must provide their employees 
with the option to opt out of the switch and maintain their prior investment 
strategy, but as with auto-enrollment, few do.87 Lawsuits that have chal-
lenged reenrollment have largely failed.88 
                                                                                                                         
83 JPMorgan SmartRetirement® 2050 Fund Institutional Shares Data (June 30, 2014), 
available at https://www.jpmorganfunds.com/blobcontent/216/297/1205478538503_FS 
-SR2050-I.PDF. 
84 See Summary Prospectus: JPMorgan SmartRetirement® 2050 Fund (Jan. 8, 2014), 
available at https://www.jpmorganfunds.com/cm/Satellite?pagename=jpmfVanityWrap 
per&UserFriendlyURL=otherresourcesld&cusip=4812A4807&fileName=SPRO-SR2050 
-I.PDF. 
Fees are for the institutional class, and those fees are typically the cheapest. The 
seventy-five-basis-point fee reflects a fee waiver, which will expire unless it is renewed. 
The fund’s charge would have been 1.01 percent without the fee waiver. Rather than 
reducing the fees, mutual funds commonly give temporary fee waivers, possibly because 
they are more flexible and make rapid changes easier. See Susan E.K. Christoffersen, Fee 
Waivers in Money Market Mutual Funds 23 (Wharton Ctr. for Fin. Insts., Working Paper 
No. 97-46-B, 2000). 
85 See Default Investment Alternatives, 72 Fed. Reg. at 60,453 (noting that the QDIA 
rule and its related fiduciary-duty relief applies to situations other than auto-enrollment, 
including “the failure of a participant or beneficiary to provide investment direction 
following the elimination of an investment alternative or a change in service provider, the 
failure of a participant or beneficiary to provide investment instruction following a 
rollover from another plan, and any other failure of a participant to provide investment 
instruction. Whenever a participant or beneficiary has the opportunity to direct the 
investment of assets in his or her account, but does not direct the investment of such 
assets, plan fiduciaries may avail themselves of the relief provided by this final 
regulation, so long as all of its conditions have been satisfied.” (emphasis added)). 
86 See, e.g., Improving Plan Diversification through Reenrollment in a QDIA, 
VANGUARD COMMENTARY (Vangaurd), Aug. 2012, at 4–5, available at https://institu 
tional.vanguard.com/iam/pdf/RENPPR.pdf?cbdForceDomain=false (suggesting that plan 
sponsors may choose to reenroll employees because of concerns about under-
diversification or to simplify administration when the employer wants to change its menu 
offerings dramatically). 
87 See Veronica Dagher, Your Employer Knows Best. Perhaps., WALL ST. J. (Feb. 7, 2011) 
at R7 (noting that “among employers that shifted their 401(k) plans to T. Rowe Price and 
conducted a plan ‘reset,’ roughly 87% of all participants remain in the target-date fund 18 
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There is good evidence that, on aggregate, these nudges are quite 
sticky.89 The popularity of lifecycle funds has exploded since the PPA.90 
T. Rowe Price reported that 96.3 percent of participants who defaulted 
into a QDIA remained invested there.91 
II. FAILED NUDGES AND THE SUPPLY SIDE 
This Part’s argument proceeds in three sections. First, I introduce some 
background on the structure of the mutual fund and retirement savings 
industries to show the inherent conflicts of interest that prevail in alloca-
tion decisions, in striking contrast with the alignment of interests that 
prevails in enrollment and contribution decisions. The next two sections 
consider two competing ways in which mutual funds might counteract a 
nudge given these conflicts. In Part II.B, I consider the possibility that 
mutual funds would convince some savers to opt out of the nudge and into 
investment strategies that are worse for them but more lucrative to the 
industry. In Part II.C, I consider how, even for those individuals who stay 
in the nudge, the industry could weaken its products in order to take ad-
vantage of the nudge. There is already significant evidence of this trend. 
In this and the next Section, I sometimes will refer to two hypothetical 
investors, “Adam” and “Ben,” who represent useful archetypes.92 In the 
                                                                                                                         
months after the conversion,” and that “57% of plans transferred to T. Rowe Price in 
2009 conducted plan resets for their employees, compared with 14% in 2005”). 
88 See, e.g., Bidwell v. Univ. Med. Ctr., 685 F.3d 613, 616 (6th Cir. 2012) (rejecting, 
under the DoL safe harbor rule, a challenge by the plaintiff, who had invested funds in a 
stable value fund. The defendant reinvested those funds in a lifecycle fund after mailing 
notices and opt-out instructions to all plan participants. The plaintiff claimed never to 
have received notice.). 
89 See, e.g., Henrik Cronqvist & Richard Thaler, Design Choices in Privatized Social-
Security Systems: Learning from the Swedish Experience, 94 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & 
PROC.) 424, 425–27 (May 2004) (observing significant investment inertia after the initial 
enrollment period, which is when investors usually receive nudges). 
90 See infra Part III.C.2. 
91 See Getting Beyond Ordinary: Advances in Automatic Savings Program Design, T. 
ROWE PRICE RETIREMENT INSIGHTS (T. Rowe Price), Feb. 2013, at 9, available at https:// 
www2.troweprice.com/rms/rps/Marketing/Articles/AdvancesinAutomaticSavingsProgramDe
sign_whitepaper.pdf. T. Rowe Price did not report the time period to which this figure refers. 
92 Far from caricatures, these archetypal investors should be understood as 
representative of characteristics affecting large swaths of the populations. Consider, for 
instance, the previously mentioned evidence on financial literacy. See supra notes 34–36. 
On the overconfidence side (Ben), see, e.g., Francesco D’Acunto, Identity, Over-
confidence and Investment Decisions 21 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Conference 
Paper, Oct. 2014), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/francesco_dacunto/papers 
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absence of the PPA’s nudges, Adam and Ben each allocated their savings 
to a number of relatively high fee funds and each trades funds within their 
retirement account relatively actively. These two traits are common and 
are typically costly compared to a passive, low-fee fund strategy.93 Alt-
hough their behavior is similar, their rationales are quite distinct. Adam is 
the prototypical “ignorant” investor: he neither knows nor wants to know 
anything about finance. Ben is highly knowledgeable about finance, he is 
familiar with the academic literature on various investment strategies and 
the efficient markets hypothesis, and he is a frequent consumer of business 
news and analysis. 
Adam, in other words, has chosen a poor investment strategy because 
he has been told to do so. His decision could follow one of two stories 
about economies of influence. In the more direct form, Adam picks his 
funds with the help of some kind of advice-giver who is financially incen-
tivized through (entirely legal) direct or indirect kickbacks94 to push him 
into high-fee funds and frequent trading,95 up until the adviser’s sugges-
tions cross a (fairly distant) regulatory line.96 A softer variant is also pos-
sible: Adam’s decisions have been influenced almost entirely by framing, 
marketing, and advertising, ranging from its most literal form (ads sug-
gesting a particular fund) to its weakest form (everything from the menu 
                                                                                                                         
/genderTrade.pdf (providing experimental evidence on the role played by gender and 
identity in investment overconfidence and aggressive trading). Certain risk-taking 
characteristics of Ben also resemble the profile of investors who are most susceptible to 
fraud. See, e.g., Applied Research & Consulting, Financial Fraud and Fraud 
Susceptibility in the United States (Sept. 2013) (FINRA research report) at 6, available at 
http://www.saveandinvest.org/web/groups/sai/@sai/documents/sai_original_content/p337
731.pdf (finding that “susceptibility to investment fraud appears to be positively 
associated with one’s ability and willingness to take on investment risk”). 
93 See supra notes 38–39. 
94 One form these kickbacks take is known as revenue sharing, which involves 
payments from a mutual-fund to a broker. This practice raises complicated legal 
questions, and it has come under fire in recent years. For a good treatment of the legal 
issues, see John A. Haslem, The Many Faces of Mutual Fund Revenue Sharing 44–46 
(Oct. 31, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2136614. 
There is a lot of ambiguity and very little transparency in the area. 
95 See supra note 84. 
96 The typical standard for brokers is suitability—the product must be suitable for the 
client’s needs—which is generally seen as a relaxed standard. Registered investment 
advisers are held to a fiduciary standard, which is seen as stricter (though still often 
relaxed). See infra Part III.C.2; Benjamin P. Edwards, Fiduciary Duty and Investment 
Advice: Will a Uniform Fiduciary Duty Make a Material Difference? 2 (Mar. 2, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=2469987. 
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of funds themselves, to fund names,97 to subtle placement decisions on a 
trading platform). 
By contrast, Ben trades frequently in and out of high-fee funds be-
cause, despite being well versed in efficient markets literature, he is highly 
confident—rightly or wrongly98—that his own sophistication and abilities 
exceed that of the market. Ben’s rationale may also be quasi-expressive, a 
point I return to in Part III.B. In other words, he enjoys the feeling of ac-
tive trading and trying to beat the market. 
Nudging is a problematic public-policy strategy for helping either cat-
egory of investor: Adam largely because of the conflict of interest prob-
lems explored in Part II, and Ben for reasons explored both in Part II.C 
and in Part III.B. At the outset, though, it is worth noting another problem: 
even if, as I suspect a libertarian paternalist would argue, we want Ben and 
Adam to be treated differently by nudges, it will be hard to tell them apart 
after our first round of nudging. In particular, some Adams and some Bens 
will likely have opted out of the nudge for reasons that are not discernable 
to policymakers or regulators on the basis of readily observable character-
istics because their visible choices are identical.99 
Throughout this Article, I take for granted (and defend somewhat in 
Part II.A) some basic assumptions shared by most serious finance re-
search—including the assumption that for most individual investors, active 
trading strategies are unlikely to beat the market, and that most individual in-
vestors are served by passive, index-based strategies that track the market.100 
A. Mutual Funds and Misaligned Incentives 
Several characteristics of the allocation decision stand in contrast to 
the contribution decision and make nudging particularly problematic. This 
Section outlines those attributes. First, investment decisions involve prob-
lems for which there is some legitimate uncertainty, even among experts, 
about the correct answers to the problems. That uncertainty makes it hard 
to distinguish between real debates, for example, over broad asset allocation 
                                                                                                                         
97 Fund names matter all too much. One study found that a fund name change to a 
“hot” style generates an average abnormal flow of 28 percent without any associated 
performance improvement. Michael J. Cooper, Huseyin Gulen & P. Raghavendra Rau, 
Changing Names with Style: Mutual Fund Name Changes and Their Effects on Fund 
Flows, 60 J. FIN. 2825, 2825–58 (Dec. 2005). 
98 There is an extensive literature on overconfidence. See supra note 92. 
99 Various authors have argued that nudging is rarely if ever theoretically wrong, just 
not always optimized correctly. See, e.g., Orszag & Sunstein, supra note 71. 
100 See infra note 111. 
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strategies,101 and invented debates, like the choice between overactive and 
passive management strategies.102 That ambiguity, in turn, provides an 
opportunity for investment firms to exploit in their marketing and sales, 
which may overemphasize factors, like past performance, that should have 
little relevance to savers’ decisions. Additionally, the ambiguity may make 
it easier for financial institutions to obscure the issues at hand in lobbying 
efforts before Congress and regulatory agencies. 
Second, difficulties specific to many savers compound the inherent com-
plexity of choosing an optimal allocation approach. In particular, Ameri-
cans have very low levels of basic financial literacy. In a five-question 
survey testing basic everyday finance, 61 percent of recipients answered 
one or more questions wrong.103 Financial literacy is especially low among 
young people104 and among minority populations.105 As a compounding 
factor, most Americans do not invest significant time in financial planning, 
                                                                                                                         
101 See, e.g., Gary P. Brinson, L. Randolph Hood & Gilbert L. Beebower, Determi-
nants of Portfolio Performance, 42 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 44 n.4, 39–44 (1986). 
102 This debate at times resembles the debate over climate change. Numerous 
empirical analyses have failed to find anyone who, over time, can beat the market by 
picking publicly-traded stocks. These findings are well supported by most versions of the 
efficient markets hypothesis. Empirical studies have also shown that any returns a mutual 
fund buyer could make from someone who could beat the market would be eaten up by 
the high fees of active management. See, e.g., Laurent Barras, Olivier Scaillet & Russ 
Wermers, False Discoveries in Mutual Fund Performance: Measuring Luck in Estimated 
Alphas, 5 J. FIN. 179, 214–15 (Feb. 2010) (citing numerous others). The most outspoken, 
grumpy, and eloquent proponent of this view is Jack Bogle, the founder of Vanguard, 
which is known primarily for its index funds. See Jeff Sommer, One Answer to the Index 
Fund: Build a Better Index, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2013, 11:10 AM), http://dealbook 
.nytimes.com/2013/11/11/one-answer-to-the-index-fund-build-a-better-index/?_r=0 (quot-
ing Bogle’s plainspoken advice on active managers: “The problem is that you don’t know 
what will perform well in the future.”). Whether there is doubt at the margins, for the 
average individual investor in the market, there is no debate over indexing versus active 
management. 
Yet active managers continue to claim otherwise, and investors continue to chase past 
returns. See, e.g., Blake Phillips, Kuntara Pukthuanthong & P. Raghavendra Rau, Limited 
Attention, Horizon Effects, and the Uninformative Persuasion of Mutual Fund Investors 
(Oct. 29, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) at 1–2, available at http://www.iimb.ernet 
.in/research/sites/default/files/Mutual%20Fund%20Stale%20returns.pdf (finding that 
despite warnings in extremely small type, past performance does not guarantee future 
performance). 
103 FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH. INVESTOR EDUC. FOUND., FINANCIAL CAPABILITY 
IN THE UNITED STATES: REPORT OF FINDINGS FROM THE 2012 NATIONAL FINANCIAL 
CAPABILITY STUDY 31 (2013), available at http://www.usfinancialcapability.org/down 
loads /NFCS_2012_Report_Natl_Findings.pdf. 
104 See Annamaria Lusardi, Olivia S. Mitchell & Vilsa Curto, Financial Literacy 
among the Young: Evidence and Implications for Consumer Policy (Jan. 28, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript) at 2, available at http://www.dartmouth.edu/~alusardi/Papers 
/Financial_literacy_young.pdf. 
105 See supra note 103, at 28. 
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with 39 percent of workers reporting spending “no time at all” planning 
for retirement.106 It is possible that the topic of retirement is too confusing, 
seems too remote, or is simply uninteresting relative to other priorities (a 
possibility often forgotten by people who spend their days writing about 
retirement savings). This remains true even as staggeringly few Americans 
(14 percent) are “very confident” (and only another 38 percent “somewhat 
confident”) about their ability to retire comfortably.107 
Third, and most consequentially, allocation involves deep, intractable 
conflicts of interest between savers and retirement providers.108 This is a 
sharp, key contrast with the contribution decisions discussed in Part I.B, 
which involve an alignment of interest because both investment managers 
(through fees) and individual savers (through having more money availa-
ble at retirement) can benefit from increasing savings rates. 
Not so in the allocation context. Fund advisers are not compensated 
based on performance, but rather based on fixed annual management fees 
charged on assets under management. These asset-based fees represent the 
vast bulk of fees—84 percent—earned by the retirement savings indus-
try.109 In many instances, financial boons to the fund industry and retire-
ment service providers110 come at the detriment of the saver. First, because 
                                                                                                                         
106 2007 Minority Retirement Confidence Survey (Employee Benefit Research 
Institute Fact Sheet) at 1, available at http://www.ebri.org/files/MRCS07.FS1_Final.pdf. 
The percentages reporting spending “no time at all” are even higher among African 
Americans (48 percent) and Hispanics (50 percent). Id. 21 percent of workers report 
spending more than twenty hours a year (although it is hard to know how accurate such 
self-reported numbers are). Id. 
107 Ruth Helman, et al., The 2012 Retirement Confidence Survey: Job Insecurity, Debt 
Weigh on Retirement Confidence, Savings, 369 EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., Issue 
Brief No. 369, Mar. 2012, at 1, available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI 
_IB_03-2012_No369_RCS2.pdf. 
108 In this Section, I lump together as “retirement providers” all entities that make 
money off their role in providing and managing defined-contribution plans (basically 
everyone except the participant and the employer), because they are largely the same 
despite specific differences in the role and legal regime governing each. Clearly, the 
conflicts I describe here may be significantly worse in some instances (for example, a 
single entity that both selects the fund menus and runs funds, and in doing so tends to 
over select its own funds for the menu) than in others (for instance, a record-keeper or 
trustee whose tasks are essentially administrative). 
109 Deloitte Consulting LLP, Inside the Structure of Defined Contribution/401(k) Plan 
Fees: A Study Assessing the Mechanics of the ‘All-In’ Fee 6 (Investment Company 
Institute Nov. 2011), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_11_dc_401k_fee_study.pdf. 
Plan sponsors also charge per-participant and per-plan administration fees, which do not 
pose the same alignment issues. Id. at 36. 
110 Who pays what fees to whom is a complicated and interesting question, both 
because retirement plans and mutual funds have complicated structures, but also because 
of features that tend to obscure a clear understanding of fee arrangements, such as 
revenue sharing, bundled services, and various indirect payments. However, the 
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the saver’s contributions are diminished by the amount of any fees, the saver 
retires with fewer assets (a loss that grows each year, given the interest 
that could have been earned on the foregone savings). Second, many of the 
ways in which investment advisers earn those pennies are correlated with 
deleterious investment strategies. Most empirical and theoretical work 
within finance suggests that individual savers should generally be using 
inexpensive, passive, index-based funds, which are the cheapest and least 
lucrative to their advisers.111 
By contrast, many activities that are profitable for fund advisers dam-
age individual investors’ returns beyond the loss of the fees themselves. 
Fees tend to be higher for funds with active or complex trading strategies 
that, even before fees are taken into account, typically produce returns 
lower than passive strategies.112 High rates of portfolio turnover and fre-
quent trading, either by the retirement saver directly or within a fund held 
by the retirement saver, generate lucrative brokerage fees, but such churn-
ing damages returns.113 Mutual funds cross-subsidize the performance of 
their more lucrative high-fee funds at the expense of their low-fee funds.114 
Fees charged on assets under management do not sufficiently align in-
centives for retail mutual funds. While good market performance obvious-
ly increases assets under management and is thus positive for both saver 
and fund manager, it is not the only way to increase assets and fees. Retail 
funds also engage in extensive marketing efforts, including revenue-
sharing arrangements with brokers, to sell their mutual funds to new inves-
tors. Fund investors bear the costs, regardless of whether the costs are 
beneficial to the fund. Fund marketing and sales efforts, among the most 
significant and hard-to-unpack fees charged by funds, are at best a 
                                                                                                                         
distinctions are largely irrelevant to this Article’s argument. For a good overview, see 
supra note 94. 
111 For the most famous and best, popular statement, see generally BURTON G. 
MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET (W.W. Norton & Co., 1973). 
112 There are numerous studies in this vein. For a representative and recent work by 
two very well-known finance scholars, see Eugene Fama & Ken French, Luck Versus 
Skill in the Cross-Section of Mutual Fund Returns, 65 J. FIN. 5, 1915, 1916 (2010) 
(finding no evidence that we can distinguish any active managers who can beat the 
market from skill rather than luck, and that costs generally consume any possible 
outperformance). 
113 See, e.g., Theodore Day, Yi Wang & Yexiao Xu, Investigating Underperformance 
by Mutual Fund Portfolios at 14 (May 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://utd.edu/~yexiaoxu/Mfd.PDF (finding significant excess turnover in mutual funds 
that diminishes returns). 
114 See José-Miguel Gaspar, Massimo Massa & Pedro Matos, Favoritism in Mutual 
Fund Families? Evidence on Strategic Cross-Fund Subsidization, 61 J. FIN. 1, 73, 74 
(Feb. 2006). 
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deadweight loss to current fund shareholders. They may also damage fund 
investors in general because they are often used to sell bad funds and may 
make funds too large to be effective.115 Although these “12b-1 fees” have 
been heavily critiqued and do not perform the function for which they 
were originally intended, the retail fund industry has successfully lobbied 
to keep them.116 
Clearly, there are good mutual funds out there, but there is good reason 
to suspect that bad mutual funds go unpunished and often find their way 
into the most vulnerable investors’ portfolios. Typical market correctives 
do not work well for retail mutual funds. The most striking empirical evi-
dence of this is that funds that track the S&P 500 index charge sharply 
different fees.117 Yet many investors continue to choose more expensive 
ones, despite overwhelming evidence that fees are the most important—
perhaps the only—salient characteristic in that decision.118 Funds have 
occasionally advanced the argument that individual select funds have 
comparable performance potential but higher fees because of other ser-
vices bundled with the funds.119 However, outright mistake by investors is 
a better explanation. In an experiment asking Wharton MBA students and 
other elite subjects to choose between receiving returns from four S&P 
500 index fund prospectuses, with fund services unbundled and therefore 
irrelevant, 80 percent of subjects fail to minimize fees even after experi-
menters gave them a simplified one-page fee disclosure.120 The study’s 
                                                                                                                         
115 For an excellent account of the many ways in which 12b-1 fees for fund marketing 
and distribution have become a disaster for mutual fund investors (and undermining 
typical mutual fund arguments about the supposed benefits of such fees including 
economies of scale), see John P. Freeman, The Mutual Fund Distribution Expense Mess, 
32 J. CORP. L. 4, 740, 745, 748, 770, and passim (2007). 
116 The SEC, which created the 12b-1 fee system in the late 1970s to deal with a spe-
cific problem faced by mutual funds at the time, has attempted to reform the system, but 
it has met heavy resistance. See Mutual Fund Distribution Fees; Confirmations, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 47,064, 47,064 (Aug. 4, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 239, 240, 249, 270). 
117 Joe Light, Don’t Pay High Fees for Index Funds, WALL ST. J., May 4, 2013, at B9. 
118 See, e.g., Edwin Elton, Martin Gruber & Jeffrey Busse, Are Investors Rational? 
Choices Among Index Funds, 59 J. FIN. 1, 261, 286 (2004). Index funds may use different 
underlying trading techniques to match an index’s return, but it is not clear that this 
should explain the fee differences, given that all of them advertise themselves as tracking 
the S&P 500. 
119 Sean Collins, Are S&P 500 Index Mutual Funds Commodities?, 11 INV. CO. INST. 
PERSPECTIVE 9 (Aug. 2005), available at http://www.directorscouncil.org/pdf/per11 
-03.pdf. The most absurd explanation advanced by some funds for higher fees was toll-
free telephone support (which is provided by most funds, including the lowest-fee funds 
at Vanguard). 
120 James J. Choi, Xavier Gabaix, David Laibson & Brigitte C. Madrian, Why Does 
the Law of One Price Fail? An Experiment on Index Mutual Funds 4, 27 (Nat’l Bureau of 
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lesson is clear: people—even financially literate people—simply do not 
understand the role fees play in returns, and instead focus on other, irrele-
vant information. Funds know this. In obtaining materials from Morgan 
Stanley, a research assistant to the same study reported the following quote 
from the Morgan Stanley representative about its S&P 500 fund offering: 
There are better S&P 500 index funds out there .... There’s no question 
that Vanguard’s fund will outperform ours .... Do not buy our S&P 500 
index fund. It will not accomplish anything. I wouldn’t be able to look at my-
self in the mirror in the morning if I recommended that fund to you.121 
The legal regime is not much help either. In lieu of direct regulations 
on, say, limits to mutual fund fees,122 the legal regime governing mutual 
funds takes a page from corporate governance. An independent board of 
directors reviews fund decisions to ensure they are in the best interest of fund 
shareholders.123 But the system does not work well because mutual funds 
are fundamentally different from typical corporations: institutional inves-
tors in funds will walk, rather than vote in new board members, when funds 
underperform.124 The risk of negative asset flows provides some market 
discipline, but it may also leave many individual investors abandoned—
likely the most vulnerable investors who are least able to assess fund per-
formance. In other words, intelligence walks, rather than fights for control. 
Market correctives may be even worse in the retirement context, in 
which employees tend to have few fund options (often from a single family 
                                                                                                                         
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12,261, 2008), available at http://www.nber.org 
/papers/w12261. 
121 Id. at 7 n.57. 
122 Although the law requires that mutual fund fees be reasonable, courts have largely 
abandoned any role in assessing that reasonableness. See Jones v. Harris, 559 U.S. 335, 
353 (2010); Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., 694 F.2d, 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1982). 
In part, this is an institutional competence concern, but as an explicit matter, courts have 
(in a striking parallel of judicial interpretations of the various duties under corporate law, 
which are dwarfed by the business-judgment rule) chosen to focus on process and the role 
of the board of directors in reviewing mutual fund fees. 
123 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2012) (section of the Investment Company Act of 1940 that 
provides for review of mutual fund advisory contracts by independent board). 
124 John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and 
Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 102 (2010). A similar 
problem may be emerging for regular corporate governance as institutional investors 
come to dwarf the role of individual, dispersed shareholders, upending the longstanding 
Berle-Means view of corporate governance—although activist investors have stepped 
into that role. See Ron Gilson & Jeffrey Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency 
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. 
REV. 863 (2013). 
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of funds) and little recourse (short of changing employers) if they do not 
like those options.125 The mutual fund industry has taken advantage of 
this. When a mutual fund parent company owns an entity that serves as a 
plan trustee, that trustee strongly prefers to choose funds offered by its 
parent.126 It will also tend to retain its own bad funds when they underper-
form; in fact, the worse the fund, the higher the comparative likelihood of 
retaining one’s own funds versus other companies’ funds. In other words, 
“it pays to set the menu.”127 Beyond menu design, retirement service pro-
viders have other ways to direct participants toward expensive, badly 
performing funds—for instance, through advice provided directly through 
their retirement service help-lines, through marketing materials, or more 
subtly, through design choices on the online retirement platform.128 
Financial advisers, including brokers (who have no fiduciary duty to 
their clients), make the problem worse. Most of them are compensated 
based on (entirely legal) kickbacks.129 A study of the Oregon University 
System’s retirement plan found that more vulnerable—less educated and 
less highly compensated—participants were more likely to use a broker 
provider, and that the resulting portfolios were substantially worse than 
non-broker-advised portfolios.130 In a recent troubling (but unsurprising) 
audit study, financial advisers not only failed to de-bias auditors with bad 
portfolios, they actively reinforced bad biases and made portfolios 
                                                                                                                         
125 Of course, fiduciary duties governing retirement plan menu design may 
compensate for this, but courts have largely bowed out of the role of reviewing 
employers’ plan menu designs. See infra Part III.C.2. Moreover, retirement plan 
participants are likely to assume that employers have chosen good funds for them and 
may exercise less independent due diligence. 
126 Veronika K. Pool, Clemens Sialm & Irina Stefanescu, It Pays to Set the Menu: 
Mutual Fund Investment Options in 401(k) Plans 21 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 18764, 2013), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18764. The 
authors also tested the possibility that plan trustees had private information about their 
own family’s funds that caused them to retain them, and found that future performance of 
the retained funds fared no better. 
127 Id. 
128 While legal academics have been very attuned to conflicts of interest in the mutual 
fund and investment advisory industry, they have paid too much attention to formal 
disclosure means—such as prospectus design—and essentially no attention to the way in 
which data is presented to someone about to purchase a mutual fund (i.e., the design of 
the retirement platform or “mutual fund supermarket”). 
129 See, e.g., John Freeman, Stewart Brown & Steve Pomerantz, Mutual Fund 
Advisory Fees: The Cost of Conflicts of Interest, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 83, 84 (2008). 
130 See generally John Chalmers & Jonathan Reuter, What Is the Impact of Financial 
Advisors on Retirement Portfolio Choices and Outcomes (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 18158, 2012), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18158. 
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worse.131 The advisers pushed the auditors—including those who arrived 
with well-designed, low-fee portfolios—toward high-fee funds and en-
couraged clients to foolishly chase past returns.132 Nonetheless, in surveys, 
people show that they trust investment advisers and brokers to help them 
make good decisions.133 Other experimental evidence has shown the sig-
nificant degree to which actors “wrongly” trust advisers, finding that ad-
visers who project confidence can maintain sway regardless of accuracy in 
situations in which assessing accuracy is difficult or costly.134 
B. Counter-Nudges and Vulnerable Savers 
Nudgers seem to have forgotten their own lesson: all decisions are 
subject to subtle influences that can have profound consequences.135 In 
particular, the retirement industry has a variety of ways to counter-nudge 
participants into alternative strategies. Investment decisions are typically 
made through retirement platforms in which subtle wording and design 
decisions can significantly affect decision making. On top of that, employ-
ees may seek advice through other means that leave them susceptible to 
subtle or overt pressure. That pressure need not even be deliberate on the 
part of industry actors, and can be an unconscious response to feeling that 
lucrative products are threatened. Experimental evidence in the disclosure 
context has demonstrated that parties may worsen their behavior in re-
sponse to disclosure requirements.136 Worse still, the savers who make the 
                                                                                                                         
131 See generally Sendhil Mullainathan, Markus Noeth & Antoinette Schoar, The 
Market for Financial Advice: An Audit Study (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 17929, 2012), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17929.pdf. 
132 Id. 
133 Two-thirds of respondents to one survey said they thought investment advisers 
would help them make better decisions. See RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, U.S. 
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS 
AND BROKER-DEALERS 99 (2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008 
/2008-1_randiabdreport.pdf. 
134 Sunita Sah, Don Moore & Robert MacCoun, Cheap Talk and Credibility: The 
Consequences of Confidence and Accuracy on Advisor Credibility and Persuasiveness, 
121 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 246, 254 (2013) (providing 
experimental evidence that when it is difficult to assess adviser accuracy, the confidence 
heuristic—that an adviser’s confidence increases her credibility—trumps the calibration 
hypothesis that overconfidence will backfire). 
135 Similar issues have long been raised in the context of disclosure. See, e.g., Howard 
Beales, Richard Craswell & Steven Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Infor-
mation, 24 J.L. & ECON. 491, 491 (1981) (pointing out that many information-based 
approaches “mask many of the complexities involved in the ways in which information is 
communicated to consumers and the ways that consumers (and the market) respond”). 
136 See infra note 180. 
66 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:035 
worst and least considered allocation decisions may be among those who 
are most likely to be susceptible to such counter-nudges—an “Adam” who 
does not want to consider his options extensively and is readily susceptible 
to pressure from third parties.137 
As suggested earlier, allocation nudging is fundamentally different, in 
this sense, from nudges designed to increase enrollment or contributions 
because of the intractable conflicts of interest in the former. When there 
are not direct adverse interests, we can expect the unnudged population to 
be composed largely of those whose preferences would be better satisfied 
by opting out.138 In other words, in a situation without direct adverse interests 
between the party being nudged and the party implementing the nudge, the 
unnudged will consist largely of those who, in some sense, think they have 
a strong preference contrary to the default choice. There is reason to sus-
pect that this is largely true in the contribution context: when contributions 
go up, retirement services providers win (in the form of more assets under 
management, resulting in higher fees), but the typical saver does, too. 
But in a situation characterized by direct adverse interests, the entities 
implementing the nudges—the retirement services providers—will do 
their best to counteract the nudge. That response, entirely unsurprisingly, 
can take two forms: either they can seek to get people to opt out of the 
nudge (the subject of this Section) or they can accept the nudge and find 
other ways to undo its worst effects (the subject of Part II.C). 
                                                                                                                         
137 An excellent, parallel argument is made with respect to overdraft protection on 
checking accounts by Willis, supra note 52 (arguing that banks used marketing and other 
tactics to successfully undermine the law requiring them to seek an individual’s opt-in 
consent for overdraft protection on her checking account, and suggesting—both based on logic 
and with the help of survey data—that opt-ins were particularly concentrated among those who 
overdraft frequently and may have most needed legal protections against the practice). 
I agree substantially with Willis’s article; my argument diverges in two respects, 
beyond the focus on a different substantive domain from overdraft protection. First, in 
Parts II.C and II.D below, I focus in large part on describing other unintended conse-
quences of nudges (i.e., that are not concentrated on vulnerable populations opting out). 
Second, I believe the distribution of various actors’ preferences in the retirement 
allocation context is slightly more nuanced and ambiguous than in the overdraft protection 
context, and may require refining or at least reinterpreting Willis’s framework to fit here. 
In fact, many in the financial-services industry supported the Pension Protection Act (for 
a number of obvious reasons, many discussed in Part I, supra), unlike banks who outright 
opposed the passage of limits on overdraft protection and then sought to undermine the 
legislative scheme. By contrast, the story here involves the possibility of retirement-
services companies not only undermining the PPA’s nudges (the focus of this section) but 
also taking advantage of the PPA’s nudges (the focus of Part II.C). This distinction may, 
in large part, stem from the fact that overdraft protection is a binary decision, versus the 
continuous, complicated, and evolving set of choices presented in allocation. 
138 Whether that idea is remotely coherent in this context is the subject of the next 
section (the “Bens”). 
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A nudge advocate might object that we just need to make the nudge 
stronger. We could tell investors, for instance, in big, red type: “Don’t 
trust the advice you’re being given: they’re all lying to you, and you 
need to choose low-fee funds.” While that might push some Adams into 
low-fee funds, we are left with an ever-irreducible version of the same 
problem: some portion of the unnudged will be those who still did not 
get it—the absolute weakest of all savers, those who we should be most 
worried about and for whom the argument for government intervention is 
strongest. Some of the Adams will be unable to discount the false claims 
of firms that (implicitly or explicitly) promise them higher rewards. And 
again, on the basis of easily observable characteristics, we will not be 
able to identify or distinguish those opt-outs from the Bens who opt out. 
While limited data is available, there is evidence that some of those 
who ultimately opt out of allocation defaults are making objectively bad 
decisions. A Vanguard study of reenrollment in a single large plan re-
ported that 42 percent of participants who opted out created inappropri-
ately diversified portfolios, including those with high concentrations of 
company stock.139 In another domain, taxes, a study found that low-
income filers opted out of a nudge designed specifically to target them.140 Fre-
quent overdrafters—the population targeted by overdraft protection 
nudges—were the most likely to opt back into the overdraft system.141 
In addition, as nudges become increasingly strong and increasingly 
begin to resemble pure paternalism, the purely political rationale (the 
notion that we can split the difference) for nudging, instead of regulating, 
becomes increasingly weak. The light touch starts to look increasingly 
heavy-handed, even as it still fails to accomplish part of what it is meant 
to do—and even as those effects are concentrated among those who most 
warrant government intervention. 
                                                                                                                         
139 Gary Mottola & Stephen Utkus, Reenrollment and Target-Date Funds: A Case 
Study in Portfolio Reconstruction, VANGUARD CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH 
(Vanguard), Sept. 2009, at 13, available at https://pressroom.vanguard.com/content/non 
indexed/Reenrollment_and_target_date_fund_a_case_study_in_portfolio_reconstruction 
.pdf (finding that men, older participants, and wealthier participants were more likely to 
opt out. However, the study did not report opt-out statistics for specific segments of more 
vulnerable populations, nor did it indicate whether the poor diversification strategies were 
concentrated among any particular demographics of opt-outs.). 
140 Erin Bronchetti, Thomas Dee, David Huffman & Ellen Magenheim, When a 
Nudge Isn’t Enough: Defaults and Saving Among Low-Income Tax Filers 28 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16887, 2011), available at http:// 
www.nber.org/papers/w16887. 
141 See supra note 137. 
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C. Incentives to Weaken Nudges 
Even to those whose allocations are successfully nudged by the PPA, 
the actual benefits are highly ambiguous—and can be expected to become 
worse over time,142 given typical responses143 to legal rules. So far, the 
primary effect of the PPA’s nudges with respect to portfolio allocation has 
been pushing significant numbers of employees into “lifecycle” or “target-
date” funds,144 funds whose asset allocation shifts from riskier to less risky 
funds as an employee approaches retirement. The popularity of these funds 
has exploded since the PPA, from $71 billion in assets in 2005 to $378 
billion in 2011. It is estimated that more than half of all defined-
contribution assets will be in lifecycle funds by 2020.145 The switch to 
lifecycle funds as a default choice addressed an important problem: many 
plans previously defaulted savers into cash or money market funds that earn 
insignificant interest rates, resulting in stagnant retirement savings (actual-
ly declining in real dollars). Many savers stayed in such funds.146 Improv-
ing that misallocation decision is undoubtedly a victory for the PPA. 
But there are serious reasons to be hesitant about the overwhelming 
migration of savers into lifecycle funds, including relatively high fees, a 
short and mixed performance track record, difficulty for investors in 
understanding and monitoring the components of their fund (because they are 
funds-of-funds), and extreme heterogeneity among offerings with identical 
                                                                                                                         
142 For a general argument that behavioral economics forgets that its findings can also 
endogenously affect models—as firms seek to use behavioral economics to manipulate 
markets in their advantage—and a specific application to the domain of product liability 
in tort, see Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The 
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999). 
143 The notion that actors’ (sometimes unanticipated) responses to regime changes 
may have counterproductive effects is obviously commonplace in legal analysis. The 
critique is also familiar to all rules (as opposed to standards and case-by-case adminis-
tration). They create a line that actors are tempted to walk right up to. See, e.g., Cass 
Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 995 (1995) (rules allow evasion); 
MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL STUDIES, 41–42 (1987) (summarizing the typical 
anti-rule argument that “unjust outcomes will occur more often because people will 
actively attempt to arrange their affairs so that they are favored by the rules”). Rules can 
also become outdated as circumstances change. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 993, 
though that is distinct from the argument that actors will actively change those 
circumstances so as to make the rules less effective. 
144 As mentioned in Part I.C, while other types of funds, including balanced funds, could 
meet the requirements to be a QDIA, plan administrators have overwhelmingly chosen 
lifecycle funds as their QDIAs (This is probably a good thing: the concerns discussed in 
this section are likely even worse for balanced funds, which have even more variation). 
145 Josh Charlson et al., Target-Date Series Research Paper: 2012 Industry Survey, 
MORNINGSTAR FUND RESEARCH, May 2012, at 3. 
146 Choi et al., supra note 10. 
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labeling. These suspicions can only be expected to increase as the funds 
become more popular. Nudging does not, of course, solve the problem that 
regulated entities will react to rules to minimize their fallout. Notably, fees 
for TDFs now vary quite widely, from 0.15 percent for Vanguard’s Target 
Retirement Series all the way up to a staggering 1.47 percent for the Legg 
Mason Target Retirement Series.147 Sixteen of the TDFs tracked by Morn-
ingstar have asset-weighted expense ratios above 1 percent, which is re-
markably high when compared to the comparable offerings from Van-
guard and Fidelity (0.19 percent). 
TDFs offered for a particular retirement date by competing fund fami-
lies are often viewed as comparable products, and most savers will be 
offered only one fund family’s TDF series. But studies have found that 
TDFs exhibit significant heterogeneity: TDFs offered by different fund 
companies with the same target date have very different risk-return pro-
files.148 More concerning is that heterogeneity appears to have increased 
significantly since the PPA came into force, as funds have sought to dif-
ferentiate themselves on factors other than fees.149 Put bluntly, some 
scholars have suggested that the growing deviation in TDF returns can be 
seen as a measure of obfuscation by the funds. Increased competition in 
the TDF market thus far has mainly created increased obfuscation.150 
Again, this is consistent with what we know about competition in the 
mutual fund industry, where most evidence suggests that competition does 
not do a good job reducing fees, and that independent boards have not 
solved the problem either.151 
                                                                                                                         
147 Josh Charlson et al., Target-Date Series Research Paper: 2013 Industry Survey, 
MORNINGSTAR FUND RESEARCH, 2013, at 50, available at http://corporate.morningstar 
.com/us/documents/ResearchPapers/2013TargetDate.pdf. 
148 Pierluigi Balduzzi & Jonathan Reuter, Heterogeneity in Target-Date Funds and the 
Pension Protection Act of 2006 (Feb. 22, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2022672. 
149 Id. at 19. 
150 Id. 
151 Morley & Curtis, supra note 124, at 98. A few scholars have asserted that the 
mutual fund industry has the hallmarks of a competitive marketplace. See John C. Coates 
IV & R. Glenn Hubbard, Competition in the Mutual Fund Industry: Evidence and 
Implications for Policy (Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 592, 151, 
2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1005426. For a 
representative critique, see John P. Freeman, Working Paper Responding to the Advisory 
Fee Analysis in AEI Working Paper #127, June 2006, ‘Competition and Shareholder 
Fees in the Mutual Fund Industry: Evidence and Implications for Policy’ by John C. 
Coates, IV, and R. Glenn Hubbard (Am. Enter. Inst., Working Paper, 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=984507. 
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Other studies have pointed to agency problems in TDFs.152 TDF man-
agers have strong incentives to select their family’s own funds—and per-
haps especially their family’s poorly performing funds, which are other-
wise hard to sell. Inertia in the 401(k) context may reduce the likelihood 
that funds will be punished for this behavior in negative asset flows.153 In 
fact, TDFs on average appear to underperform against balanced funds.154 
TDFs also tend to use active strategies, which are costly and may further 
reduce investor returns. Of the forty-five series of TDFs tracked by Morn-
ingstar, twenty-five have 89 percent or more assets invested with active 
strategies; only six consist of 90 percent or more passive, indexed strate-
gies.155 TDFs also charge additional fees for repackaging their constituent 
funds (and updating them according to the fund’s glide path), and many 
predict those expenses will offset any gains from using TDFs.156 
Even as the possible risks of TDFs can be expected to get worse, the 
nudge is coupled with little regulation. The QDIA definition is relatively 
broad, requiring mainly that the fund follow a glide path that risk-adjusts 
allocations as retirement approaches.157 DoL’s regulatory oversight has 
consisted largely of proposing disclosure rules for TDFs.158 The SEC 
began looking at TDFs in 2009,159 but took no action; it seems unlikely 
that they will, given that the SEC’s regulatory infrastructure for mutual 
funds is focused on disclosure. 
Participants nudged into TDFs may be even less likely than the aver-
age fund investor to monitor their fund’s fees, risk profile, performance, 
and other factors. For one, many of the nudged are those who paid no 
attention to the choice in the first place. For another, the nudge itself will 
be interpreted as implicit advice by the employer160—a nod of confidence 
that will make participants even less likely to investigate independently. 
                                                                                                                         
152 Vallapuzvha V. Sandhya, Agency Problems in Target-Date Funds (Mar. 14, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript), draft available at http://ssrn.com/abstracat=1570578. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Charlson, supra note 145, at 23. 
156 Mauricio Soto, Robert K. Triest, Alex Golub-Sass & Francesca Golub-Sass, An 
Assessment of Lifecycle Funds 17 (Bos. Coll. Ctr. for Ret. Research, Working Paper, 
2008), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/wp_2008-10-508.pdf. 
157 Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Default Investment Alternatives Under Partici-
pant-Directed Individual Account Plans (September 2006), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa 
/newsroom/fsdefaultoptionproposalrevision.html. 
158 75 Fed. Reg. 73,987 (Nov. 30, 2010) (The regulations have not been adopted.). 
159 Leslie Wayne, Target-Date Mutual Funds May Miss Their Mark, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 24, 2009, at 8; U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Public Hearing on 
Target Date Funds and Other Similar Investment Options (June 18, 2009) (transcript), 
available at https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/targetdatefunds/targetdatefunds061809.pdf. 
160 Madrian & Shea, Power of Suggestion, supra note 60, at 1182. 
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III. FAILED NUDGES AND THE DEMAND SIDE 
A. Gaps in the Nudging Program 
As the previous Part suggested, a problem with nudging is that it pri-
marily addresses the demand side—here, the side of individual retirement 
savers making investment choices—while ignoring the supply side and its 
desire and ability to influence demand. Even on the demand side, there is a 
major disconnect between what nudges are supposed to “solve” and what 
the nudges are.161 Nudging developed out of insights into certain repeated 
cognitive mistakes, but many nudges do not seem designed to correct or 
draw attention to those mistakes. Instead, they simply substitute a weak 
means of pushing a substantive preference that is different from what 
would otherwise happen. This gap, I think, limits the potential for the 
nudging project to succeed. 
Take the case of minimizing mutual fund fees, which is perhaps the 
most widely agreed-upon problem in consumer choice of mutual funds, 
and part of the backdrop of criticism that the PPA sought to address.162 
The Wharton experiment (discussed in Part II.A) elegantly demonstrated 
this problem, in which MBAs failed to avoid the most funds, all designed 
identically to track the S&P 500.163 In that experiment, some of the funds 
with higher fees were assigned higher past returns in particular periods. 
Especially in choosing among identical styles of funds, this data should 
have no impact on choice, as past returns do not predict future performance. 
There are at least two readily plausible cognitive explanations for why 
those Wharton investors—like many investors—failed to minimize fees. 
For one, we are likely to anchor on returns in trying to figure out what 
investment will make the most money. In other words, if past returns are 
available, we may focus on those, and they crowd out our ability to com-
prehend and evaluate other, more relevant data such as fees. For another, 
we are subject to the gambler’s fallacy: we see winning streaks when luck 
is the better explanation. 
The nudge into TDFs does not address either of these; indeed, it has no 
real visible connection to either. Instead, it substitutes a substantive goal of 
pushing a particular type of fund. As discussed in Part II.C, this fund may 
not even be the most desirable type, perhaps in part because the libertarian 
paternalist school is so intent on arguing that it is fixing cognitive prob-
lems, not substituting its own substantive judgment. Nowhere does this 
                                                                                                                         
161 This theme is also explored in KELMAN, supra note 2, which also exhaustively 
explores the intellectual history of the nudging school and the behavioral research that 
served as its precursor. 
162 See supra notes 110–134. 
163 See supra note 120. 
72 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:035 
nudge help people understand the problem with anchoring on returns, or 
help them to focus more appropriately on fees.164 This is equally true of other 
problems in the allocation context that we might want nudges to address—
excessive frequency of trading in one’s account, or failing to diversify. 
In other words, our strategies may inevitably do more to counterbias 
savers rather than debias them. Debiasing is difficult—perhaps impossible 
in the real world of constrained time, resources, and interest on the part of 
consumers. But in the context of retirement savings, counterbiasing re-
quires policymakers to choose a particular outcome towards which to bias 
savers. In counterbiasing, we are simply substituting one lexical step in a 
decision making process for another, without making the decision making 
process itself any better. That may not be preferable to—and is almost 
certainly less transparent than—simply mandating that outcome, which at 
least has more certain distributional consequences on the types of savers 
whose outcomes are affected. 
The use of counterbiasing instead of debiasing may also make con-
flicts of interest more intractable. Since people are still engaged in an 
inappropriate decision making process, it is easier for a third party to 
throw additional counterbiasing tactics at a consumer. Consider the so-
called “Snackwell effect,” the nickname for the effect when consumers eat 
more low-calorie labeled cookies than normal cookies. Since low-calorie 
labeling has simply substituted another heuristic for choosing food prod-
ucts, rather than moving eaters into a more informed decision making 
process for those choices, results of this labeling policy may be unpredict-
able and undesirable. 
The nutrition comparison raises another issue: although debiasing is 
difficult, if not impossible, it may be worth investing in expensive debi-
asing strategies in the nutrition context. It is a domain in which consumers 
make repeated decisions—multiple times a day—and it is not easily sub-
ject to third-party management. By contrast, retirement investment deci-
sions may not be a good candidate for debiasing (if it were even possible), 
because they are decisions that can be made infrequently, easily managed 
by a third party (as in the days of defined-benefit plans), and arguably 
have fewer personal values at stake. 
The problem of a gap between the problem and the remedy in nudging 
becomes even clearer by reference to a domain in which nudges seem to 
                                                                                                                         
164 Although it would be more consistent with the nudging program, it is not clear this 
would be possible or desirable. If we know that the one piece of relevant data is fees, for 
instance, why do we not simply require investors to choose the lowest fund fee, or require 
employers to provide the lowest fund fee? Kelman echoes this point in his critique of 
nudging under the fast and frugal school. KELMAN, supra note 2, at 172. And investor 
literacy is an elusive goal. See supra note 35. 
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work well: the contribution part of the retirement decision. To the extent 
that a cognitive bias is responsible for low contribution rates, that bias has 
to do with inertia, procrastination, and time-framing issues (our inability to 
consider our future selves). The nudge directly counteracts that because it 
forces a choice; its methodology directly overcomes inertia either by 
choosing a default rule in an opt-in regime, or by forcing a decision in an 
active choice regime. In either instance, there is a close connection be-
tween the problem and the remedy. 
B. The Problem with Taking Preferences Seriously 
It is not clear that nudging makes normative sense, for reasons that are 
slightly different from the typical normative critiques levied against nudg-
ers by the libertarian right.165 In the context of a tax-subsidized paternal-
istic program designed to force people to save, the goal of giving people 
“autonomy” may not have much logic to it, either as a descriptive matter 
or as a normative matter. 
Let us return to Adam and Ben, and assume both opt out of the contri-
bution nudge—Adam because he is successfully counter-nudged into a 
more lucrative strategy, and Ben because he believes he has a trading 
strategy that will beat the market over time. The libertarian paternalist 
might perceive Ben’s decision to opt out of the nudge as a good outcome, 
because it respects his autonomy. By contrast, the libertarian paternalist 
would likely want to fix Adam’s problems: we believe that a series of 
cognitive problems has caused Adam to choose poor means to a presuma-
bly knowable end—maximizing his retirement wealth. Of course, we face 
the problem—a pooling equilibrium problem common in legal re-
gimes166—that there is no readily observable way to tell Adam and Ben 
apart in the group of people who have opted out of the nudge. Both will 
appear the same to any regulatory regime, even though some have left the 
default investments for “good” reasons, and others for “bad.” 
At a deeper level, the libertarian paternalist’s desire to leave Ben alone 
to his errors seems flawed both descriptively and normatively. Their ar-
gument could take three forms, each of which either is not an accurate 
depiction of what Ben is really doing, or does not provide a compelling 
reason to value his autonomy above policymakers’ paternalistic judgment 
in this particular context. 
                                                                                                                         
165 See supra Part I.B.1. 
166 For a discussion of pooling equilibrium problems in law, see DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, 
ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1998). 
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First, while we think Ben is probably making a mistake, there is, in 
fact, uncertainty about the correct means to achieving maximum retire-
ment wealth.167 Given the uncertainty, and given that these may be rea-
sonably “well-considered” mistakes, our desire to protect Ben’s autonomy 
tips the scale enough that we should not override his decision to opt out. 
Second, Ben is revealing a distinct risk preference from the median 
saver for whom we designed our nudge, which we should respect. 
Third, Ben’s behaviors are not remotely “mistakes” at all: in fact, 
Ben’s ends are different from or more complicated than most savers’, and 
we are supposed to take an agent’s chosen ends seriously. Ben’s true ends 
may include not only maximizing his retirement wealth, but also a demon-
stration of his own ability to play the market, the expressive value of his 
making particular bets about the world, or the fun or adrenaline that he 
experiences in making trades in his portfolio and watching the results. In 
other words, we can almost always rewrite an agent’s means as their ends, 
in ways that I think most of us would find quite plausible and coherent, 
which perhaps points to an intrinsic flaw in libertarian paternalism. For 
instance, consider the two pictures we might paint of a gambler. She may 
gamble to make money, in which case, if we know she will lose money on 
average and over time, we might want to regulate her behavior. Or she 
may actually just enjoy aspects of the experience of gambling, whether or 
not it is financially profitable over time, in which case the libertarian pa-
ternalist might want to respect her autonomy. 
None of these accounts justifies leaving Ben to his mistakes, in large 
part because of general problems with preference utilitarianism.168 The 
                                                                                                                         
167 A common critique of libertarian paternalism is that regulators themselves may be 
subject to cognitive biases, which may in fact make their nudges systematically flawed. A 
thoughtful discussion of biases that may affect policymakers, and some of the possible 
treatments, is Paul Brest, Quis custodiet ipsos custodies? Debiasing the policymakers 
themselves, in THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 481, 481–493 (Eldar 
Shafir ed., Princeton U.P. 2013). 
In that vein, Richard Posner has expressed concern with the idea that we ought to 
push retirement savers into equity-dominated portfolios. Noting that equity-driven portfo-
lios were badly hit in the financial crisis, Posner argued that this push was the result of a 
series of cognitive biases on behalf of those designing policy, who gave “advice based on 
the kind of myopia that bases predictions about the future on naïve extrapolation from the 
past.” Richard A. Posner, Treating Financial Consumers as Consenting Adults, WALL ST. 
J., July 22, 2009 (It is worth noting that the market has substantially recovered since 
Posner’s complaint was written, although defending any particular approach to asset 
allocation strategies is somewhat beyond the scope of this paper—which largely accepts 
the conventional wisdom of modern finance as being, if not perfect, at least better than 
most other approaches. See supra note 102.) 
168 See Mark Kelman, Hedonic Psychology, Political Theory and Law: Is Welfarism 
Possible?, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 81–82 (2004) (arguing that typical strategies used by 
welfarists are problematic: hedonic utilitarianism fails because there is no good reason to 
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first account—that even if Ben wants to maximize retirement savings and 
policymakers are 95 percent sure the best way for him to do that is to 
pursue a passive strategy, we should let Ben err for autonomy reasons—
does not have a lot going for it. The notion that Ben is erring “better” than 
Adam in any meaningful way seems hard to defend (because Ben has read 
more finance literature? because Ben could or would defend his error 
more passionately than Adam?). In fact, to the extent Ben’s poor decision 
making stems from the powerful cognitive effect of overconfidence, the 
very theory that led to libertarian paternalism—that we should correct 
behavioral errors that we identify—would strongly suggest that we could 
assist Ben by “de-biasing” him.169 
The second account, arguing that Ben has a different set of risk prefer-
ences from the default saver for whom our policymaker designed the nudge, 
makes some analytical sense, but little practical sense. For one, there is 
empirical evidence that it is simply not true: recall the Vanguard evidence 
that many opt-outs are just making bad decisions and under-diversifying, 
not adjusting their risk profile. Moreover, there is no reason to think that 
many, if any, savers can meaningfully answer the question “How much risk 
do you want to take in your retirement savings?” in the abstract. The ques-
tion has little meaning for most people, and it requires too much data that 
people either have little access to, or that is largely uncertain, such as future 
income and date of retirement. We also know that many workers who 
could have employed strategies on their own did not pursue them until TDFs 
were offered, a reminder that third parties define their preferences.170 To 
                                                                                                                         
think that “pleasure” or “pain” (or equivalent but better modern measurements by 
hedonic psychologists) matter for a particular subject, given the many forms of 
happiness; but given what we know about behavioral psychology, preference 
utilitarianism also fails because we can only tell whether preferences are “correct” by 
reference back to hedonic utilitarianism). 
That the problem of preference incoherence, so prominent in rational-choice theory, is 
not solved by behavioral law and economics stems from the fact that most of the latter 
school is simply a form of rational-choice theory, rather than a coherent or separate 
theory of its own. See Mark Kelman, Behavioral Economics as Part of a Rhetorical Duet, 
50 STAN. L. REV. 1577, 1579 (1998). 
For another type of challenge to the preference assumptions made in much of the 
behavioral law-and-econ literature, see Barbara Fried, But Seriously, Folks, What Do 
People Want?, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1250 (2013) (asking what happens to much of this 
work if we question the typical assumption that agents’ “true” preference is to maximize 
consumption, as opposed to “minimiz[ing] the time and mental energy spent on trades”—
or, taken even further, that their preference is to not “go through life relating to their 
environment as a potential source of gains from trade”). 
169 Related arguments are made in a generalized form by CONLY, supra note 54, at 4. 
170 See Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Utkus, Target-Date Funds in 401(k) Retire-
ment Plans (Wharton Pension Research Council, Working Paper 2012-02, Mar. 2012), 
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the extent we rely instead on their revealed preferences, behavioral eco-
nomics again helps remind us that this is no help: the question is too sensi-
tive to framing issues and other biases. Moreover, if the only form of au-
tonomy we want to respect is a small amount of variation in individual 
risk preferences, there are narrower and safer ways to accomplish this than 
the current free-for-all. 
The third argument a libertarian paternalist might make—that Ben’s true 
ends are something unique, and we have to take those seriously—is con-
siderably more compelling, but ultimately just as unconvincing. For one, it 
is not clear we can ever coherently distinguish between means and ends 
without recursion. The libertarian paternalist might think the compulsive 
gambler who gambles because she enjoys the thrill of it all, rather than to 
make money, still holds an even “higher” end of wealth preservation, 
which she has simply forgotten because of a cognitive or physiological 
bias. In large part, this presents another version of the conventional time-
framing problem that is pervasive across law, and to which there is no 
technical solution.171 In Ben’s instance, we can easily imagine that when 
Ben hits age sixty-five and finds that his retirement fund is inadequate and 
underperformed relative to those who followed the nudge, he may wish we 
had forced him to listen back when he was twenty-five. We do not have to 
imagine it: we know empirically that workers’ intentions towards and 
perceptions of their own retirement change considerably with age,172 and 
that confidence in retirement savings varies with age.173 Which of the 
                                                                                                                         
available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/12/12-04.pdf. Of course, this is in 
many ways the core insight of those who work on choice architecture. 
171 Kelman, supra note 2, at 3 (pointing out that an agent “does not have a single 
evaluative perspective” and we have to defend our decision to privilege one of those 
perspectives); see also Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive 
Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591, 594 (1981) (identifying the same problem as 
pervasive in criminal law in determinations of blameworthiness, which are inevitably 
dependent on how we choose to time-frame a defendant’s actions). 
172 See David Ekerdt, Karl Kosloski & Stanley Deviney, The Normative Anticipation 
of Retirement by Older Workers, 22 RESEARCH ON AGING 1, 16 (2000) (explaining that 
the sense of proximity to retirement impacts behavior towards retirement planning); 
David Ekerdt, Karl Kosloski & Stanley Deviney, Stability and Change in Plans for 
Retirement (HRS/AHEAD Working Paper Series, No. 96-035, July 1996) (explaining 
how intentions of plans in retirement, e.g., whether to work part time, vary considerably). 
173 See, e.g., OneAmerica, Plan Participant Survey (Summer 2012), http://oneamerica 
.newshq.businesswire.com/sites/oneamerica.newshq.businesswire.com/files/publication/file 
/Participant_Web_Survey_Results_for_Web.pdf. Of course, some portion of this dimin-
ished confidence could also be due to more accurate information—but that information 
feeds inexorably into an agent’s self-conception of her preferences and ends, again 
rendering the notion of measuring those ends descriptively and normatively incoherent. 
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various versions of Ben are policymakers meant to respect in considering 
an agent’s ends? There is, of course, no real answer in a descriptive sense. 
Beyond the descriptive problem, there is also a normative question: 
Should we care? Setting aside deep philosophical debates about the value 
of autonomy,174 the answer also depends on what we think our retirement 
system is supposed to accomplish. Grand libertarian rhetoric notwithstand-
ing, there is absolutely nothing obvious or inevitable about the merits of 
autonomy in 401(k) allocation. In fact, our private retirement savings 
scheme is already deeply paternalistic175 and coercive—in the form of the tax 
advantage we provide for defined-contribution savings. Why do we offer 
this scheme in the first place? Those who would say it serves a primarily 
societal function—creating a retirement safety net and preventing individ-
uals from becoming wards of the state—should not be so hesitant about 
stating the obvious: we need to tell Adam and Ben how to invest their money. 
By contrast, one can imagine more individualistic conceptions of the sub-
sidy—encouraging people to participate in the market and helping them 
develop financial literacy, in which case perhaps errors are valuable. Al-
ternatively, perhaps the real function of the scheme is to provide a valua-
ble subsidy to the mutual fund industry, although there may be more effi-
cient ways of doing that. 
This implies that the value of nudges and other “soft” approaches 
might be very different in the retirement context than in the general investment 
context, depending on one’s theory of why we want individuals participat-
ing in either. In other words, it is totally plausible to think that we should 
mandate particular investment strategies in a tax-advantaged retirement scheme 
that is designed to lessen the burdens on the state to provide for people in 
old age, but at the same time to want to allow individual, self-directed 
participation in the stock market to allow a wider range of purposes, in-
cluding self-expression. The point is that answering these questions cannot 
simply rely on some underdeveloped notion of revealed preferences—it 
has to rely instead on arguments about the rationale underlying an already 
pervasively regulated system created by government tax expenditure. 
It can be difficult to understand the jump frequently made by those an-
ti-paternalists who understand the role of cognitive biases and other fram-
ing choices, accept the inherent difficulty and incoherence of ever measur-
ing a “true” preference, worry that government nudging will be incomplete or 
flawed because of further cognitive biases, and then conclude that the pre-
nudged “state of nature” is thus somehow “neutral” or superior when 
measured on autonomy grounds.176 In making that final jump, many of 
                                                                                                                         
174 CONLY, supra note 54, at 2–3. 
175 Weiss, supra note 15, at 1279. 
176 See, e.g., MARK D. WHITE, THE MANIPULATION OF CHOICE: ETHICS AND LIBER-
TARIAN PATERNALISM 149 (2013). See also SUNSTEIN & THALER, supra note 1, at 252–53. 
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these authors seem to conflate normative philosophical arguments for the 
intrinsic worth of autonomy with positive “proof” that un-nudged prefer-
ences better respect autonomy. 
Of course, it remains entirely plausible that once we accept that prefer-
ences will always be manipulated somehow by someone, the normative 
value of autonomy is better served, in a real-world positive sense, by a 
system in which preferences are manipulated “more” by democratic gov-
ernments than by, say, big business and advertising firms. Even more 
likely, it may just be the case that autonomy, in a world where all our desires 
are contingent and subject to framing and manipulation, is just a vapid 
concept for describing policy choices. 
C. The Limits of Other Remedies 
1. Why Disclosure Won’t Help 
Remedies that seek to improve allocation decisions through improved 
disclosure or financial literacy are difficult to take seriously, given the 
overwhelming evidence on behavioral biases, investor literacy,177 and the 
lack of incentives for typical corporate-governance remedies to work.178 
The problems with disclosure, a technique scholars and policymakers have 
often taken as a panacea, have been the subject of prominent academic 
critiques in recent years.179 In the conflict-of-interest-rich environment of 
retirement savings, there is reason to suspect disclosure could be not just 
useless, but actually have negative consequences—a phenomenon of which 
there is growing evidence in related areas of law. On the demand side, 
disclosure may increase the trust individuals have without them focusing 
on the content of the disclosure; on the supply side, experiments have shown 
                                                                                                                         
177 See supra Part I.A. 
178 While there are limits to disclosure in the public-company context as well, there 
are incentives for some investors to take advantage of informational advantages (for 
example, by analyzing disclosures) and effectively arbitrage corporate-governance rights. 
See, e.g., Ron Gilson & Jeffrey Gordon, Agency Capitalism: Further Implications of 
Agency Capitalism (European Corporate Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 
239/2014, Feb. 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=2359690. The role of exit rights in the mutual fund context vastly diminishes those 
incentives. See supra note 124. 
179 See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. 
REV. 647, 665 (Feb. 2011); Matthew A. Edwards, Empirical and Behavioral Critiques of 
Mandatory Disclosure: Socio-Economics and the Quest for Truth in Lending, 14 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199, 248 (2005); Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory 
of Disclosure Regulation and Other Costs of Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473, 511 
(2007); Robert A. Prentice, Moral Equilibrium: Stock Brokers and the Limits of 
Disclosure, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 1059, 1105 (2011). 
2015] SEPARATION OF INTELLIGENCE AND CONTROL 79 
that advisers may give “worse” advice after disclosing, in an attempt to 
counteract possible effects of disclosure.180 
But the regulatory regime governing both retirement plans (through 
the DoL) and mutual funds (through the SEC) still relies primarily on 
disclosure. The DoL has recently modified fee disclosure rules to require 
plan administrators, usually employers, to collect and disseminate to par-
ticipants information on fees charged by all providers involved in a re-
tirement plan.181 It is hard to imagine that this will accomplish much. Even 
if employees were likely to read and comprehend the disclosure—a full 
eleven pages long in the DoL’s simplified model version182—it is unclear 
how employees would know if fees were appropriate or not. It is even more 
unclear what an employee should do if the fees seemed inappropriately 
high, as the collective action problems are enormous,183 and the notion 
that retirement plan fees play much role in employees’ choice of where to 
work is obviously suspect. The DoL’s guidance to employees on what to 
do with fee information—carefully written to avoid suggesting any stance 
by the agency—provides little help.184 
Even the best recent counter-critique of “notice skepticism” does not 
rehabilitate the possibilities for disclosure in the retirement savings 
realm.185 With a particular focus on Internet privacy, Ryan Calo has elo-
quently argued that before we give up on notice-based strategies, we 
should experiment with more innovative forms of disclosure, such as “vis-
ceral notice” or “showing” rather than telling the results of a particular policy. 
Unlike nudges, he argues that notice does not attempt to “manipulate pref-
erences but instead gives consumers the information they need to act upon 
preferences.”186 But one of Calo’s key assumptions is “that consumers come 
to the web with preexisting privacy preferences,”187 providing a good 
                                                                                                                         
180 Daylian Cain, George Loewenstein & Don Moore, The Dirt on Coming Clean: 
Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2005). 
181 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-5 (2013). 
182 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, ABC Plan 401(k) Fee Disclosure Form, available at http:// 
www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/401kfefm.pdf. 
183 Plaintiffs’ firms can and do play some role in remedying these problems, but they 
are of little help in the retirement fund context because courts are reluctant to play a role 
in judging fees. See supra Part III.B. 
184 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Understanding Your Retirement Plan Fees, http://www 
.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/understandingretirementfees.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2014). 
185 Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1027, 1057 (2012). 
186 Id. at 1046. Advocates of nudges, many of whom emphasize that they want to 
respect “ends” while only nudging “means,” might disagree with Calo’s characterization—
whether or not their distinction makes coherent analytical sense. 
187 Id. at 1046 n.106. 
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reason to let individual consumers more precisely tailor their online be-
havior to their own personally desired optimal level of privacy. 
As discussed in Part III.B, that assumption of heterogeneous prefer-
ences that are known to consumers is not meaningfully true in the retire-
ment-allocation context. On one level, core preferences are likely to be 
fairly homogenous: maximize wealth for retirement. On the more fine-
grained level, we may not trust individuals’ assessments of their own het-
erogeneous preferences, again either because we think they are “wrong” 
and subject to some kind of cognitive bias that, if they recognized, or 
given the passage of time and changing preferences, they would want to 
have overridden, or because we do not care because we believe the retire-
ment system serves a social rather than individual function. 
Calo’s article stems from the widespread sense that disclosure is, in his 
paraphrase of the Churchill quote, “the worst regulatory mechanism, ex-
cept for all of the alternatives.”188 Direct regulation, so the typical argu-
ment goes, may have unintended consequences, including stifling innova-
tion, and may be harder to enforce. Uncertainty of what the best result is 
warrants a light touch. However, as we increase and refine notice require-
ments to try to produce intended results, we are inevitably making the 
same judgment calls that direct regulation would require. For instance, the 
toughest proposal for disclosure elsewhere in financial products regula-
tion—Jill Fisch’s idea of “conform or explain”189—would require regula-
tors to decide what a “plain vanilla” product looks like. That call requires 
policymakers assessing the same kinds of data they would need to require 
all products to conform. If the only reason we choose disclosure is to ac-
commodate a degree of uncertainty—a problem inevitable in all policy-
making—we ensure that those who most need our advice, however uncer-
tain it is, will be those who are least likely to get it. That is virtually 
ensured not only by financial illiteracy, but also because notice incentiviz-
es regulated entities to take steps to counter-bias any potential conse-
quences from disclosure. 
2. Limits of Fiduciary Duties 
Another approach has involved proposals to broaden the scope of fidu-
ciary duties190 that apply under ERISA to entities involved in retirement 
                                                                                                                         
188 Id. at 1047. 
189 The most articulate proponent of this strategy is Jill Fisch, Rethinking the 
Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 2028–35 (2010) 
(arguing for a “conform or explain” regime in the mutual fund context, since funds 
should be thought of as resembling financial products rather than corporations). 
190 There is a broader debate about expansion of fiduciary duties in the investment 
advice and broker-dealer context, and Dodd-Frank required the SEC to consider changes 
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plans. This approach may seem like a form of direct regulation, but in 
reality it tends to have so many safe harbors that it is more accurately 
described as a soft approach—a nudge, in a sense, directed at the retire-
ment industry and employers by offering a menu of approaches likely to 
decrease possible liability. Such efforts at strengthening these duties in-
clude broadening the interpretations of the duties themselves,191 or ex-
panding the group of people deemed fiduciaries.192 Once again, these 
strategies are unlikely to help much because of the pervasive conflicts of 
interest in the retirement and fund industries with respect to allocation 
decisions, and also because the party that would have to get involved to 
make them work well—the judiciary—is not likely to step up to the task. 
In the most general sense, fiduciary duties seem like they could be 
helpful. Fiduciary duties serve as a legal tactic for institutional design, a 
                                                                                                                         
to the standards applicable to both (including possibly giving broker-dealers the same 
fiduciary duty as an investment adviser). For a good discussion, see Edwards, supra note 
96. See also SEC, Study on Investment Advisers and Broker Dealers (Jan. 2011), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf; SEC, Recommendation of the 
Investor Advisory Committee: Broker-Dealer Fiduciary Duty (2013), http://www.sec.gov 
/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/fiduciary-duty-recommendation-2013.pdf. 
191 See, e.g., James Kwak, Improving Retirement Savings Options for Employees, 15 U. 
PA. J. BUS. L. 483, 487 (2013) (arguing that DoL should reinterpret ERISA to push 
employers to offer low-fee index funds). Following their study on losses caused by fidu-
ciaries’ menu designs, supra note 38, Ayres and Curtis sent letters to numerous companies 
who have high-cost plans reminding the companies of their fiduciary duties; the fund 
industry decried the letter. See, e.g., Kelly Greene, Letters about 401(k) Plan Costs Stir 
Tempest, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2013; Jo Ann Butler and Eric Paley, Much Ado About 
Nothing...Or Is It?, NIXON PEABODY BENEFITS ALERT (Nixon Peabody LLP), July 2013), 
available at http://www.nixonpeabody.com/files/157700_Benefits_Alert_07 _18_13.pdf 
(calling the letter “condescending” and noting that Ayres “should not expect many dinner 
invitations from the plan sponsor community in the near future;” among its most 
incoherent explanations for that study is flawed and the letter should be disregarded: the 
data used in the study—the data reported by plan sponsors to the DoL—are not accurate 
in the first place because “sponsors do not accurately report fees on form 5500s!”). 
Other scholars have similarly suggested that increased evidence on the effects of 
defaults could lead to new theories of fiduciary liability that previously might have failed. 
See James Poterba, Comment, For Better or for Worse: Default Effects and 401(k) 
Savings Behavior, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 81, 122 (2004), avail-
able at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10341 (“[I]f the defaults that the firm chooses for 
its saving plan have significant consequences for worker wealth accumulation, then firms 
may face future court challenges if workers reach retirement with inadequate resources 
and their resource shortfall can plausibly be traced to the firm’s default policies.”). 
192 The most prominent instance of this is a rule proposed by DoL to expand the 
definition of fiduciaries under ERISA. 75 Fed. Reg. 65263, 65272 (Oct. 22, 2010). The 
rule met with significant resistance from industry groups, and DoL tabled it but said it 
plans to re-propose a modified rule in the future. 
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technique by which law can affect the allocation of responsibility. Fiduciary 
duties can help to create “due influence” by realigning incentives between 
a party in need of protection, the principal, and a party more capable of 
providing that protection, such as the agent, who might otherwise make 
decisions adverse to the principal. They shift responsibility from the prin-
cipal to the agent and, in their most extreme version, put the agent directly 
in the shoes of the principal. 
There are a few key aspects of the fiduciary relationship in the retire-
ment allocation context that limit its potential to help. For one, we often 
conceptually think of fiduciary duties as similar to nudges: they respect a 
principal’s given ends, while allowing a more expert party to choose the 
means to that end. Consider the familiar notion in legal ethics that the 
client chooses ends, and the lawyer chooses means. However, as discussed 
above in Part III.B, there is little reason to trust savers’ ability or need to 
choose desirable ends in the retirement context, nor to think they can intel-
ligently monitor the agent’s choice of means. 
ERISA, which encompasses many parties in its definition of fiduciary, 
may make that monitoring problem even worse. Essentially, we have 
thrown too many agents at the problem, each of whom has a financial 
conflict of interest with the saver regarding allocation decisions, and all of 
whom create an increasingly complicated web of connections that makes it 
hard for the principal to monitor. Consider the range of entities involved in 
a particular plan who may hold a fiduciary duty: the employer, the trustee, 
the company hired to administer the plan, various investment advisers, 
members of the plan’s investment committee, and others. 
Fiduciaries do not act in a vacuum. Even applying the same vague le-
galistic fiduciary standard to, for example, an employer and to a mutual 
fund family will result in very different behavior. In other words, a fiduci-
ary’s actor is not determined only from the design of its fiduciary incen-
tives—which are, like all standards, necessarily vague, incomplete, and 
indeterminate—but by other incentives it faces. For instance, such compa-
nies also face a fiduciary responsibility to their shareholders to maximize 
profits.193 As a result, other conflicts of interest—most notably that funds 
can earn lucrative fees through strategies that are detrimental to inves-
tors—will coexist with, and often trump, any vagueness in the fiduciary 
duty regime. 
Perhaps most importantly, courts have chosen to and are likely to re-
main on the sidelines, largely because of perceptions of institutional com-
                                                                                                                         
193 The independent board requirement for mutual funds is supposed to be partly a 
solution to this problem, but as argued compellingly elsewhere, it fails in that function. 
See supra note 124; John A. Haslem, Why Have Mutual Fund Independent Directors 
Failed as ‘Shareholder Watchdogs?’, 19 J. INVEST. 7 (2012). 
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petence. ERISA’s fiduciary duties, like most such duties, are subject to 
extensive exceptions and safe harbors to provide predictability for busi-
nesses involved in the retirement industry. Like the business judgment rule 
in corporate law, these exceptions have come to dwarf the rule. Likely due 
to concerns about their own institutional competence, courts have largely 
bowed out from any such role.194 In the earlier days of defined-benefit 
arrangements, typical litigation concerned fraud and other straightforward 
misappropriation—cases to which the judiciary believes itself well suited. 
Recent defined-contribution litigation instead asks courts to weigh nebu-
lous economic concepts over which courts have little institutional compe-
tence, such as whether plan provider fees are unreasonable. Courts have 
mostly rejected any role in such claims in the retirement context, or in 
mutual funds in general.195 A recent batch of plaintiffs’ suits alleging high 
fees and self-dealing against major employers has moved further along 
than in the past, producing several large settlements, but has shown no 
signs of breaking through into the judicial regime.196 
A possible “third way” approach, encouraged by the PPA,197 involves 
programs that render advice from third parties, who receive a per-partici-
pant fee from the employer for providing allocation advice, but who ac-
cept no money from fund providers and thus do not have the same flawed 
incentives. This could theoretically solve the incentive misalignment prob-
lem created by the switch from defined-benefit to defined-contribution 
arrangements. At the same time, there are several possible concerns. First, 
unlike in a defined-benefit arrangement, in which employers bore direct 
financial obligations, the primary performance incentives on advice ar-
                                                                                                                         
194 Some scholars have noted that while there is a long-running debate on the role of 
courts in policy issues, the ERISA regime meant that cases for retirement savings losses 
following stock-market volatility were inevitable, and thus hoped that courts would at 
least grapple seriously with the policy issues. See Colleen E. Medill, Stock Market 
Volatility and 401(k) Plans, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 469, 474 (2001). 
195 See Jones v. Harris, 559 U.S. 335 (2010) (putting a burden on plaintiffs arguing 
unreasonable fees that no plaintiff has ever successfully met). That decision explicitly 
rests on a view of the role of fund governance and independent directors that most 
scholars consider faulty. See supra note 124. 
196 See, e.g., Beesley v. Int’l Paper, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7999, at *3 (S.D. Ill. 
Feb. 4, 2009); Linda Stern, How 401(k) Lawsuits Are Bolstering Your Retirement Plan, 
REUTERS, Nov. 5, 2013 (discussing the role of St. Louis plaintiffs’ attorney Jerome 
Schlichter in bringing numerous such cases). 
197 29 U.S.C. 1108(g) (2012) (defining an “eligible investment advice arrangement”—
which receives exemptions from many ERISA requirements—as an entity gives advice 
under a fee structure that does “not vary depending on the basis of any investment option 
selected” or “uses a computer model” to generate the advice). The best known of these 
programs is Financial Engines, but others include GuidedChoice or an offering from 
Merrill Lynch. 
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rangements are in the form of competition. Second, they are not mandato-
ry, so they may replicate many of the same opt-out problems discussed in 
Part II. The prevalence of opting out may not be evenly distributed among 
savers and may, once again, disproportionately affect those who most need 
interventions. Third, transparency is lacking: because the market is poten-
tially quite lucrative and very competitive, companies have been tightly 
guarded about their algorithms and underlying allocation strategies. Final-
ly, most obviously, the programs cost money that, even if technically paid 
by the employer, may reduce retirement savings, although by how much is 
an open question. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article does not conclude with an elaborate design for a more 
perfect retirement system.198 Instead, its goal is to serve as a reminder to 
paternalism-shy regulators and scholars. In leaning on soft regulatory 
solutions, we too often forget the lessons of behavioral economics itself. 
In the retirement allocation system in particular, we think too little about 
the problems posed by the unique set of misaligned incentives in mutual 
funds and retirement services. In other words, readers can view this Arti-
cle as a bit of a “nudge” itself—not a blanket decree that nudges should 
always be avoided, but an attempt to counter-bias those scholars who have 
developed overconfidence in nudge-based strategies. There is not a single 
policy option that stems from its argument, although those disappointed in 
the likely failure of allocation nudges would do well to consider direct 
regulation of the products available for investment in retirement plans. 
Such an approach would require funds to meet certain requirements with 
respect to fees and investment content in exchange for the chance to com-
pete in the lucrative, taxpayer-subsidized retirement savings game. 
Three basic implications for policy on 401(k) allocation flow from this 
account. First, what design interventions are optimal depends on what pur-
pose we want 401(k)s to serve, and we lack a coherent narrative of their 
rationale. Too often we assert abstract values—like autonomy, which ani-
mates much of the libertarian paternalist instinct—without reference to the 
                                                                                                                         
198 A good one (from outside the legal academy) is Teresa Ghilarducci, Pension 
Reform in the United States: Guaranteed Pension Accounts are Key, 2 ROTMAN INT’L. J. 
PENSION MGMT. 58, 60 (2009). Another is Dana Muir, Choice Architecture and the 
Locus of Fiduciary Obligation in Defined Contribution Plans 19 (Ross Sch. of Bus. 
Working Paper No. 1183, Dec. 2012). Muir also provides some comparative analysis of 
Australia’s “superannuation” retirement system, which may provide a useful model—
unlike many European systems, Australia’s provides for significant consumer choice and 
private competition, while at the same time entailing greater direct regulation. 
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higher-order purposes they do or do not serve in a given policy applica-
tion. It seems clear that the retirement-savings system has a paternalistic 
foundation, in the form of a tax subsidy designed to encourage a specific 
outcome, and that should provide at least some basis for guiding policy 
choices.199 
Second, to the extent 401(k)s serve a societal purpose, we should be 
skeptical of “soft” strategies—disclosure and nudging—and more readily 
accepting of direct regulation in domains that involve pervasive conflicts 
of interest, like allocation. Direct regulation can take a variety of forms—
including, in one basic version, regulating the quality and fee structure of 
those lifecycle funds that want to serve as default investment options. 
Third, we should be more aware of the alignment and misalignment of 
incentives. While this Article does not advocate a return to the defined-
benefit schemes of yesterday, it is worth recalling that defined-benefit 
schemes relied on a series of market-based incentive alignments between 
employer and employee,200 while allocation decisions in defined-contribu-
tion schemes are largely compromised because of a direct misalignment, 
or conflict, of interests. 
                                                                                                                         
199 Other underlying purposes are obviously plausible. Employer-sponsored 
retirement plans, for instance, may continue to serve firms in recruiting and retaining 
qualified workers. On why employer costs might not equal employee value, see, e.g., 
Melissa Famulari & Marilyn Manser, Employer-Provided Benefits: Employer Cost versus 
Employee Value 112, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 24, 28 (1989). 
We might also see inherent value in incentivizing widespread individual participation 
in the stock market. This purpose could help explain why some 401(k)s have a directed 
brokerage option that allows employees to pick individual stocks—an option whose 
existence is hard to explain under any understanding of academic finance, which pretty 
much uniformly would agree that individuals should not pick individual stocks in their 
retirement portfolio, if in any portfolio. Alternatively, a public-choice or capture theory 
could explain why brokerage windows—which charge higher fees and are more prone to 
lucrative churning—are allowed. 
It might also be a way of ensuring that a portion of the overall retirement-savings mix 
allows individuals to control their own risk/reward tradeoffs. For a discussion of the 
notion that individuals have, understand, or can supply an individual risk/reward 
proposition in any meaningful sense, see supra Part II.C. 
200 Those alignments could extend further, for example, to pension insurers, who had 
market incentives to monitor employers’ pension management. It should also be noted 
that another behavioral bias, availability, might be causing us to over-dramatize the 
problems faced by defined-benefit plans. Many people associate employer-sponsored 
defined-benefit plans with the numerous problems with underfunded state and local 
pensions, because the latter are in the news so much. But the analogy is fairly irrelevant: 
accounting rules and tighter standards under ERISA were able to fix most of the 
problems caused in the private-employer context, while pay-as-you-go accounting in the 
states poses an entirely unrelated set of problems. 
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The new MyRA “starter” accounts, announced in this year’s State of the 
Union address,201 may suggest a possible path towards a more paternalistic 
allocation scheme. The accounts are available to anyone, whether or not 
they have a workplace savings plan, and are run for free by the govern-
ment.202 There is only one investment option: a government-run plan that 
pays the same variable interest rate as the Government Securities Invest-
ment Fund available to federal workers;203 participants face no risk of 
losing money. Since the goal of these plans is to get new participants into 
the retirement system, an interesting question is whether these new partic-
ipants will become used to the single investment choice, and when they 
switch into the 401(k) system, react with alarm to the dizzying array of 
choices that retirement-plan sponsors normally push. The value people 
place on “choice” is not intrinsic but rather defined, in large part, by their 
expectations.204 Changed expectations could open the door to more pater-
nalistic policy interventions. 
Is nudging better than nothing? One response to this Article would 
hold that nudging reflects a feasible political compromise in an era of 
otherwise intractable partisanship, and the PPA’s nudges represent better 
regulation than simply leaving retirement savers as they were. That argu-
ment has some appeal, but it does not take nudgers at their word. Many 
nudgers have not been modest in their claims. Cass Sunstein has referred 
to nudges as “usually the best response ... in the face of behavioral market 
failures,” and believes that nudges can increase welfare “without compro-
mising the legitimate claims of freedom of choice.”205 This Article sug-
gests reasons for skepticism on both claims. 
But this Article’s argument goes further than simply saying that nudg-
ing may not be the best of all possible worlds. Indeed, there are reasons to 
worry that the PPA has in fact left some savers worse on investment alloca-
tions. TDFs are increasingly problematic in ways that could be entirely 
                                                                                                                         
201 President Obama, State of the Union address (Jan. 28, 2014), available at http://www 
.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/28/president-barack-obamas-state-union-address. 
202 White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Opportunity for All: 
Securing a Dignified Retirement for All Americans (Jan. 29, 2014), available at http:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/28/fact-sheet-opportunity-all-securing-dig 
nified-retirement-all-americans. Contributions of up to $5,500 a year can be made as long 
as the account balance is below $15,000. 
203 The fund is one of several offered as part of the U.S. government’s thrift savings 
plan, whose small range of investment options (six) all reflect passive investment 
strategies with extraordinarily low fees. 
204 Projection—a cognitive bias in which we project our own desires onto others—
might help explain why the financial professionals who oversee retirement plans assume 
that participants desire lots of complicated financial choices. 
205 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE? THE POLITICS OF LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM 
17, 165 (Yale U.P. 2014). 
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predicted by attentiveness to supply side incentives. Opt-outs are making 
poor decisions, and the distribution of opt-in and opt-out decisions on 
particular types of savers may be correlated with financial vulnerability in 
problematic ways. On top of that, the sense that nudging has fixed the 
problem—and the creation of new industry players who have redefined 
expectations around the PPA and who will now have reasons to oppose 
anything that would weaken the incentives to push people into TDFs—has 
decreased regulatory will for additional reform. 
Choice architecture is inevitable. Choices will always be contingent on 
framing and presentation, and behavioral economics has drawn valuable 
attention to that problem. But this observation does not let us escape from 
making fundamental policy choices—if anything, it only makes the need 
to make them more acute, since we have more reason to mistrust choices 
made without active intervention. 
At a general level, this Article suggests that policymakers and academ-
ics should think carefully about which domains are susceptible to nudging. 
There are three lessons. First, we should consider not only the “nudged,” 
but also other sources—the suppliers and other third parties who may seek 
to either counter-nudge or otherwise undermine a successful nudge. Se-
cond, we should remember that the concept of nudging originated out of a 
growth in behavioral economics, and we should try to reserve nudges for 
situations in which we can closely connect them to the cognitive problems 
we seek to solve. Finally, we should carefully consider whether and how 
autonomy—a key value upheld by libertarian paternalists—matters in a 
given policy domain before simply assuming that a nudge provides the 
optimal solution. Use of nudges is too often an easy way out of a difficult 
policy problem, and, not surprisingly, easy solutions to thorny policy di-
lemmas are usually illusory. 
